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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT  
 
The focus of this PhD dissertation is on the relationships between institutional logics and 
performance measurement decisions and practice within the context of the public sector. It is 
presented as a compendium of three research papers or studies. Consequently, in study one, 
we review the literature on institutional logics and on performance measurement in the public 
sector. We conceptualize performance measurement as decision-making, and draw on the 
theory of institutional logics as a complementary source of explanation for observed variations 
in performance measurement system implementation in public sector organizations. And we 
elaborate a model that illustrates the recursive relationships between institutional logics and 
each phase of the performance measurement decision process.  
In study two we test the assumption that institutional logics act as reference frames for 
organizational actors, and that they influence how organizational actors perceive ambiguous 
situations. Thus, we draw on insights from cognitive psychology to prime three unique 
institutional logics in an experimental design setting. And we provide empirical evidence for 
the influence of institutional logics on perception and judgment. The third study builds on the 
second by exploring the influence of institutional logics on perception and judgment within 
the context of performance measurement system use in the public sector. The findings not only 
provide support for the influence of institutional logics on public sector performance-use 
preferences, but they also show degrees of overlap between the institutional logics regarding 
their support for various PMS uses. Altogether, these three essays present tentative steps 
toward a better understanding of the influence of cognitive frames - specifically institutional 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the PhD thesis topic and provides a general overview of 







1.1 Introduction to the PhD thesis topic 
Contextual uncertainties in the public sector have made the management of costs and 
expectations both a practical and political imperative, hence the increasing concern with 
performance measurement and management in the public sector (Lapsley, 2008; van Dooren 
& van de Walle, 2008; Rautiainen & Jarvenpaa, 2012). The operationalization of public sector 
performance measurement systems (PMS) has however remained highly variable, making the 
use of performance information for comparison or organizational improvement exceedingly 
difficult (van Dooren & van de Walle, 2008; Fryer, Anthony & Ogden 2009; Hoque & Adams, 
2011; Rautiainen & Jarvenpaa, 2012).  
Consistent with Henman (2016), we define performance measurement as the 
‘enumeration of organizational or system level processes, outputs and outcomes’. Thus, a PMS 
represents an assemblage of interdependent tools and processes that interact to deliver the 
performance measurement goals (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Radnor & Barnes, 2007). 
PMS implementation on the other hand, refers to the operationalization of elements of, or a 
complete PMS. By operationalization, we bind to de lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) who 
conceptualize it as comprising the development of ‘capacity to act’ as well as ‘instrumental 
action’. 
And so, to understand the challenges with PMS implementation, and offer 
implementation guidance, some researchers have focused on the ‘surface factors’ i.e., the 
models, frameworks, techniques, standards and indicators, while others have focused on the 
‘process aspects’ - describing and analyzing problems with the application of performance 
measurement models and frameworks (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006). Despite these efforts, varied 
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operationalization has persisted with consequent variation in performance measurement 
outcomes and use (Fryer et al., 2009).   
Thus, some authors have proposed variability in performance measurement 
implementation and its outcomes to be due to the variation in logics applied by the decision-
makers (Pollitt, 2013) and the consequent conflict over the operational decisions and choices 
made (Adcroft & Willis, 2005; Fryer et al., 2009). Such conflict has been hypothesized to lead 
to problems in performance measurement system design, and in the collection, interpretation 
and analysis of performance measurement data (Adcroft & Willis, 2005); to disorient 
organizational actors (Gianakis, 2002), to complicate attempts at integration of new 
performance measurement systems with the old (Gianakis, 2002) and to lead to decoupling, 
cheating and different forms of gaming (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Fryer et al., 2009; Pollitt, 2013). 
However, while decisions and choices are partially grounded and informed by 
cognitive frames such as institutional logics (Ashworth, Boyne & Delbridge, 2007; Thornton 
& Ocasio, 2008; Kahneman, 2012), the nature of the relationships between institutional logics, 
decisions, practice and outcomes within the context of performance measurement in the public 
sector has been sparsely studied and is therefore not well understood (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Pollitt, 2013). Here, we conceptualize institutional logics as 
shared, socially-constructed decision-making frames (Friedland & Alford, 1991), that 
‘influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts and other considerations, endowing them 
with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative 
frame’ (Nelson et al., 1997, p.569).  
And so, whereas some authors have studied the influence of institutional logics on PMS 
implementation (e.g., Carvalho et al., 2006; Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; Rautiainen et al., 
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2017), much of this work has been conceptual rather than empirical, has focused on the 
technical elements, and has been located at the organizational level of analysis and not the level 
of the organizational actor (Micheli & Mari, 2014; Henman, 2016). Yet, public organizations 
are inhabited by individuals of varying backgrounds and affiliations, who are tasked with 
implementing the PMS. And in their implementation work and sense-making, they are likely 
to draw on diverse institutional logics, each with a potentially different relationship to 
performance measurement (Rautiainen et al., 2017). 
We believe that three major barriers have prevented more systematic and cumulative 
discourses on institutional logics and performance measurement in the public sector. The first 
is the absence of a framework linking the diverse institutional logics with performance 
measurement operationalization and outcomes, which can be used to structure research and 
discussion (Pollitt, 2013). Second is the paucity of research on the relationship between 
institutional and rational (and non-rational) choice explanations of performance measurement 
practices (Moynihan & Ingraham, 2004; Lounsbury, 2008). And third, not enough attention 
has been paid to the dynamic and often recursive interplay between institutional mechanisms 
across different levels of analysis (also, Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
This dissertation is thus focused on partially addressing this gap and these barriers, 
hence providing a platform for structured discussion on how institutional logics may affect the 
choice, decision-making process and subsequent operationalization of performance 
measurement systems at the organizational level. Specifically, our goals during the doctoral 
research period and subsequent dissertation development was, (1) to develop a conceptual 
framework that suggests how institutional logics affect the operationalization of performance 
measurement systems in the Public Sector, and (2) to test whether the foundational hypothesis 
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regarding the influence of institutional logics on organizational actor perception, judgment and 
action holds.  
1.2 The overarching research objectives and questions 
This dissertation is concerned with the following over-arching research question: How do 
institutional logics affect the operationalization of performance measurement systems in the 
Public Sector? 
To address this question, we conducted three studies: The first study was conceptual in 
nature, focused on developing a framework explicating the relationship between institutional 
logics and the various stages of performance measurement conceptualized as decision-making. 
Having conceptualized the relationships between institutional logics and performance 
measurement in the public sector, the second and third studies were concerned with 
determining: 
a) Whether institutional logics can be primed among organizational actors by 
manipulation of the environment?  
b) How these institutional logics, once primed, relate to (i) decision-making in ambiguous 
situations as are often encountered in the work setting, and (ii) the use of performance 
measurement in the Public Sector? 
In responding to these latter two questions, we operated with the assumption that (a) the 
selection in one’s cognition of which institutional logics to apply as a frame of reference could 
be triggered by written, verbal or visual cues in the environment (see for example Bargh et al., 
1996; Wegner, 1994; Berkowitz, 1984; Bateson et al., 2006); (b) these logics, once activated, 
would lead to attitudes, perceptions and behavior that is concordant with the activated logic 
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(Bargh et al., 1996; Bateson et al., 2006); and (c) these logics will relate to performance 
measurement in definably different ways. 
1.3 A synopsis of the overarching theoretical perspectives 
1.3.1 On performance measurement in the public sector  
Micheli and Mari (2014) conceptualize performance measurement as a “fundamentally 
epistemic and pragmatic act”. And in this conceptualization, they emphasize human actors and 
the interactions between them within “external realities that can constrain or facilitate action” 
(p.148, 149). 
Much of the literature on performance measurement in the public sector however 
implicitly or explicitly assumes cognitive agreement among the organizational actors regarding 
the essential properties of measurement, and that the ‘external realities’ – conflated as 
structural or knowledge based constraints – can be identified and managed (Micheli & Mari, 
2014). Thus, the idea that “(performance measurement) implementation is primarily a 
mechanistic exercise and should be susceptible to being managed by classic project 
management tools” (Bourne et al., p.767); and the imbalanced focus on the development of 
performance measurement tools, frameworks and procedures, or their critique or support 
(Micheli & Mari, 2014).  
On the other hand, the influence of motives, values and cognitive processes on 
performance measurement implementation in the public sector has been understated and 
understudied (Pollitt, 2013). Yet, actors in public organizations are oftentimes confronted with 
ambiguity in PMS definition and implementation (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006), which because 
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of diversity in perception and interpretation, occasions conflict over decisions made and 
probable differences in implementation (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Fryer et al., 2009). 
The perspective of PMS implementation taken in this dissertation is aligned to Micheli 
and Mari’s (2014) conceptualization of performance measurement in the public sector as a 
pragmatic act, involving the measurement of both physical and socially constructed objects, 
and involving the balancing of many perspectives and interests (also, Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006; 
Dalehite, 2008; Fryer et al., 2009; Pollitt, 2013. This perspective thus allows us to confront 
and address the influence of motives, values and cognitive processes in the balancing of the 
many perspectives and interests that impact performance measurement implementation in the 
public sector. 
1.3.2 On institutional logics and performance measurement 
Individuals make sense of the world through socially-derived interpretive schemes (Goffman, 
1974), and institutional logics are one such interpretive scheme that ‘condition(s) actor’s 
choices for sense-making’ (Thornton et al., 2012, p.3). In this sense, institutional logics can be 
viewed as fundamental and coherent sets of organizing principles that are unquestioned and 
unexamined assumptions about the nature of reality (Ford & Ford, 1994), and that therefore 
provide the ‘lenses through which we view everything’ (Lincoln, 1985). Thus, we anticipate 
institutional logics to define and constrain public sector actor assumptions, expectations and 
choices regarding how performance measurement is to be operationalized. 
The exact nature of the relationships between logics, decisions, practice and outcomes 
within the context of performance measurement in the public sector has however not been 
explicitly studied and is therefore not well understood (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006; Lawrence & 
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Suddaby, 2006; Pollitt, 2013). Early research that took on an institutional approach focused on 
decoupling or loose coupling of performance measurement practices (e.g., Sharifi & Bovaird, 
1995; Lawton, McKevitt, & Millar, 2000; Modell, 2001). This early research thus offered 
limited insight into the role of actors, the influence of preformed perspectives (occasioned by 
institutional logics), the engagement of organizations and individual actors in proactive 
agency, and interaction with the contextual circumstances (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). This 
is the gap that informs our broad research question, and is more amply dealt with in the three 
essays that follow. 
1.3.3 On priming as experimental methodology 
Priming - ‘the influence on later behavior by prior stimuli or events without deliberate intent 
to be influenced by them’ (Newell & Shanks, 2014, p.4) has been used in many research fields 
to assess the influence of knowledge structures on perception, attitudes, judgment, decision-
making and behavior (Bargh, 2006). It is however relatively new in PA research though 
exceptions exist (e.g., James & van Ryzin, 2016; Christensen & Wright, 2018). A typical 
priming experiment involves, first, the performance of a task intended to prime a construct of 
interest; and second, the performance of a seemingly disconnected task that is then examined 
for evidence of congruence with the primed construct.  
Priming is thus premised on a memory based model of information processing that 
presumes that information stored in memory leave behind memory traces (Tulving & Watkins, 
1975) or activation tags (Collins & Loftus, 1975) that are surfaced or activated by a priming 
stimulus. These stored constructs then influence how individuals perceive incoming 
information as well as how they subsequently interpret them (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Tulving 
& Watkins, 1975). Institutional logics, as cognitive frames of reference (Lounsbury, 2007; 
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Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) that provide individuals with rules and conventions for deciding 
which solutions get considered and which solutions get linked to what problems (Ford & Ford, 
1994; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) are also stored as ‘complex webs of meaning’ (Gioia, 1986), 
ergo, as mental constructs.  
Thus, priming, in activating one or several points of this web, activates the entire web 
of meaning that is the logic construct. And this institutional logic, once activated or evoked 
from memory, provides the context from which the public-sector actor then ‘thinks, feels, 
views or otherwise experiences the world’ (Ford & Ford, 1994), thus influencing their 
interpretation of, and reaction to, the situation that faces them (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Ford 
& Ford, 1994; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
Given its acknowledged utility in the determination of causal linkages between 
perceptions or cognition and behavior, we make use of priming as experimental methodology 
in studies 2 and 3 where we explore the influence of institutional logics on judgments in an 
ambiguous scenario (study 2) and on the utility of PMS in the public sector (study 3). 
1.4 The methodology 
Study 1 (Chapter 2) is a conceptual paper that draws on the content analysis of diverse 
literatures to develop an explanatory model. For studies 2 and 3 (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
respectively), we use experimental designs as appropriate research methodologies for causal 
inference. More specifically, we used a between groups (or, independent measures) design 
with different participants randomly assigned to each treatment or control condition. Thus, for 
these two papers we defined our hypotheses, collected primary data, and analyzed them using 
the appropriate non-parametric ANOVA methods. The choice of analytic method was 
premised on (1) the data collected was ordinal/ranked, (2) the sample sizes were moderate, and 
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(3) nonparametric tests don’t assume that the data follows a normal or specific distribution. 
Under these conditions, non-parametric methods are deemed superior to parametric methods 
(see for example, Zimmerman, 2012; Wiedermann & von Eye, 2013).  
1.5 Dissertation overview and structure  
This thesis takes the form of a compendium of academic articles that have been published, or 
are submitted, in the process revise and resubmit. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical paper that 
conceptualizes performance measurement as decision-making and draws on the theories of 
institutional logics as a complementary source of explanation for variation in performance 
measurement system implementation in public sector organizations. The paper further presents 
a model that illustrates the hypothesized relationships while highlighting the moderating role 
of organizational context, as well as the recursive nature of the relationship between the PMS, 
institutional logics and organizational actor action. This paper has been submitted for 
publication to which end we have received a revise and resubmit.  
Chapter 3 is the first of two empirical papers incorporated into this dissertation. This 
paper presents a study that uses novel priming techniques derived from behavioral and social 
psychology, to differentially surface three institutional logics – the public, market-managerial 
and professional logics, in three independent experimental groups. It then examines whether 
and how the judgments and decisions made by individual organizational actors in an 
ambiguous scenario may be influenced by institutional logics. This paper has been resubmitted 
following the first round of review. 
Chapter 4 presents the second empirical paper which narrows down on the influence of 
institutional logics on the deployment and use of performance measurement systems in the 
public sector. In this regard, this paper reveals logic congruence regarding some uses of 
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performance measurement systems in the public sector, and divergence regarding others. This 
paper has been submitted to the International Journal of Public Sector Management and has 
been accepted for publication. Table 1.1 provides a tabulated synopsis of the studies contained 
in this dissertation.  
The three articles that form the core of this dissertation are connected by several common 
threads, apart from departing from the same theoretical frameworks as shown in Table 1.1: 
a. The main independent variable of interest is common to all three studies. However, in 
study 1, institutional logics are recognized as the main influence on how performance 
measurement system implementation as decision-making is operationalized. In studies 
2 and 3, institutional logics are primed and their effect then assessed on different 
dependent variables 
b. Studies 2 and 3 respond to propositions 1 (organizational actors  actors will show 
greater support for PMS when its intended use aligns with the norms and expectations 
of their dominant or referent institutional logic) and 2 (Environmental cues such as text 
or imagery will (nonconsciously) prime the institutional logics that will consequently 
anchor the perspectives of the organizational actor regarding the PMS decisional 
problem) in study 1   
c. Studies 2 and 3 are experimental design studies, rolled out on the same study 
population, with the same manipulation techniques (priming) and using the same tools, 





Table 1.1 Synopsis of the studies 
Study/Chapter Study 1/Chapter 2 Study 2/Chapter 3 Study 3/Chapter 4 
Title Institutional Logics, 
Embedded Agency and 
Performance Measurement 
as Decision-making 
Different shades of grey: An 
experimental study on how 
institutional logics influence 
organizational actor 
perception and judgment 
Assessing performance-
use preferences through 
an institutional logics 
lens 
Authorship Benard Ngoye & Tamyko 
Ysa 
Benard Ngoye, Vicenta 
Sierra & Tamyko Ysa 
Benard Ngoye, Vicenta 
Sierra & Tamyko Ysa 




International Journal of 
Public Sector 
Management 
Publication status R&R R&R Accepted 
Research 
Question(s) 
Conceptual paper that 
examines performance 
measurement in the public 
sector through an 
institutional logics lens 
How do institutional logics 
affect the judgments made 
by organizational actors 
regarding ambiguous 
scenarios? 
How are individuals 
primed for an 
institutional logic biased 
toward whether and why 
PMS should be 




Institutional logics as 
shared cognitive frames of 




(Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006; 
Dalehite, 2008; Pollitt, 
2013; Micheli & Mari, 
2014) 
Memory-based models of 
decision-making 
(Scheufele, 2000; Loersch 
& Payne, 2011) 
Institutional logics as shared 
cognitive frames of 
reference (Thornton et al., 
2012) 
Memory-based models of 
decision-making (Scheufele, 
2000; Loersch & Payne, 
2011) 
Institutional logics as 
shared cognitive frames 
of reference (Thornton et 
al., 2012) 
Performance 
measurement use in the 
public sector (Behn, 
2003; Spekle & 
Verbeeten, 2014) 








Priming as a 
manipulation technique 
Findings The implementation of 
PMS conceptualized as a 
multi-stage decision 
process variously 
influenced by the actor’s 
referent institutional logics  
The empirical evidence is 
suggestive of judgment 
regarding the ambiguous 
scenario presented, to be 
congruent to the primed 
logic 
The evidence is 
suggestive of both 
institutional logic 
divergence and 
consensus as far as 
support for PMS use in 





And so, while all three studies contribute to the thesis in general, study 1 provides the 
greatest breadth regarding how institutional logics, as referent cognitive frames, may influence 
PMS implementation.  
Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, provides an integrated discussion of the theoretical 
contributions of the three papers, as well as managerial and policy implications. The broad 
limitations of the dissertation are likewise presented, as are possibilities for future research. 
This chapter therefore fittingly concludes the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 2  
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, EMBEDDED AGENCY AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT AS DECISION-MAKING 
 
This chapter addresses the first objective of this PhD thesis by developing a framework 
explicating the relationship between institutional logics and the various stages of performance 
measurement implementation conceptualized as decision-making.  
The chapter has been has been submitted as a scientific paper for publication and has received 





We conceptualize performance measurement as decision-making and draw on the theory of 
institutional logics to explain observed variations in performance measurement system 
implementation in public sector organizations. Drawing from diverse literatures, we develop 
and present a model that illustrates the influence of institutional logics at each stage of the 
performance measurement decision-making process. We also highlight the moderating role of 
organizational context and individually held values, as well as the recursive nature of the 
relationship between the PMS, institutional logics and organizational actor action. 
Assumptions and boundary conditions under which the model holds are presented, as are 





A question of increasing concern to researchers in the field of performance measurement is 
why there is so much variation in performance measurement implementation within and 
between organizations applying the same performance measurement system (Spekle & 
Verbeeten, 2014). The public sector has particularly struggled with this variation that has made 
the use of performance information for comparability or organizational improvement 
exceedingly difficult. Hyvonen and colleagues (2009), for example, observed significant 
variations in performance measurement system (PMS) implementation among units of the 
Finnish Defense Forces whose professed response was similar, as did Hoque and Adams 
(2011) in their study of the use of the balanced scorecard in 51 Australian Government 
Departments, and Rautiainen and Jarvenpaa (2012) in their comparative study of two Finnish 
cities ostensibly employing the same PMS. 
Research on the causes of such variation however remains thin (Pollitt, 2013) and has 
primarily focused on the tools and techniques of performance measurement, on indicators and 
dimensions, on relative performance evaluation and on the support or critique of specific 
measurement systems; and not on the processes involved in implementation (Modell, 2009; 
Micheli & Mari, 2014). Where such processes have been studied, most have understated the 
inhabited nature of the public-sector organization by people whose doing may influence the 
PMS implementation process (Micheli & Mari, 2014). The influence of motives, values and 
cognitive processes on such ‘doings’ has also been understated (Pollitt, 2013). Moreover, 
where cognitive processes have been considered, much of the literature seems to assume 
coherence among the actors regarding PMS definition and implementation (Micheli & Mari, 
2014). Yet, ambiguity in PMS definition and implementation often confronts actors in public 
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organizations (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006), leading to diversity in understanding and conflict 
over decisions made about the PMS (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Fryer et al., 2009).  
Conflict over decisions and choices is however an implicit part of any discourse in 
management, and it arises in part from the varied perspectives applied by organizational actors 
in discourse and in decision-making (Kahneman, 2012). For example, in the public-sector 
performance literature, Bianchi and Williams (2015) relate behavioral distortions in PMS 
implementation to differences in perspectives between the PMS designers and users, and 
between the managers and employees. Though not addressed by Bianchi and Williams in their 
study, these perspectives are nonetheless variously grounded and informed by diverse 
cognitive structures (Ashworth et al., 2007; Kahneman, 2012). Institutional logics, defined as, 
‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs 
and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time 
and space, and provide meaning to their social reality’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p.804), are 
one such set of cognitive structures. And by providing the lenses through which actors view 
their organizational realities (Gioia, 1984; Ford & Ford, 1994), it is reasonable to assume their 
influence on how organizational actors perceive and react to performance measurement (also, 
Skelcher & Smith, 2015).  
However, despite calls to further examine cognitive influences on PMS 
implementation, this topic has remained under-researched (Pollitt, 2013). And of the few but 
important studies in this area, focus has tended toward the meso-organizational level (e.g., 
Skelcher & Smith, 2015). Consequently, the nature of the relationships between cognitive 
structures such as institutional logics, and PMS implementation, at the micro-level of the 
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organizational actor (which drives the meso-level responses) is not well understood (Vakkuri 
& Meklin, 2006; Pollitt, 2013).  
Thus, to partially address this gap we draw from Micheli and Mari’s conceptualization 
of performance measurement as a “fundamentally epistemic and pragmatic act” (2014, p.148) 
and recast PMS implementation as decision-making. In this sense, PMS implementation 
becomes a practical rather than idealist endeavor that is at once both objective and inter-
subjective, and that is attuned to institutional contexts that may both enable and possibly 
constrain options and action.  Moreover, this conceptualization emphasizes the role of human 
agents and the interactions between them within “external realities that can constrain or 
facilitate action” (Micheli & Mari, 2014, p.149). These “external realities” include cognitive 
structures such as institutional logics that anchor the perspectives of, and the constructions by, 
the said organizational actors regarding the PMS, thus delimiting their considerations, 
judgment and consequent action.  
We are however, not the first to examine performance measurement in the public sector 
through an institutional lens (e.g., Modell, 2009, and Pollitt, 2013 for overviews). Much extant 
literature however focuses on neo-institutional theory, on the characterization of institutional 
research on performance measurement and on institutional effects of performance 
measurement; rather than institutional logics (Modell, 2009). We extend the work of these 
authors by making the following additional contributions: First, by conceptualizing 
performance measurement as decision-making we re-orient research toward a view of PMS 
implementation that underscores performance measurement as social construction, and that 
stresses the relational and interpretive nature of human activity within specific contextual 
constraints and enablements. This is important as though exceptions exist (e.g., Yang & 
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Modell, 2012), much of the performance literature applying an institutional lens has been 
preoccupied with the macro and meso-levels of analysis, and has ignored the role and 
experiences of the organizational actor in relation to the institutions within which they are 
embedded. Second, we focus on institutional logics rather than the broader institutional theory. 
Third, we connect extant research dots to provide a systematic account of, and build a model 
encompassing the range of relationships between institutional logics and performance 
measurement implementation. Moreover, we theorize on when, why and how actors implicitly 
or explicitly mobilize institutional logics in this PMS implementation process, and the likely 
effects of such institutional work.  
In the next section, we provide an overview of the literature behind the concepts. We 
then synthesize extant literature on institutional logics, decision-making and performance 
measurement to derive an explanatory model based on the theorized relationships. We 
conclude by discussing the paper’s implications for the study of performance measurement in 
the public sector. 
2.2 Situating the literature 
2.2.1 Conceptualizing PMS implementation as decision-making 
Radnor and Barnes (2007) define performance measurement as ‘quantifying either 
quantitatively or qualitatively, the input, output or level of activity of an event or process’ 
(p.393). Similarly, a PMS invokes an assemblage of interdependent tools and processes that 
interact to deliver the performance measurement goals. Thus, we consider PMS 
implementation to mean operationalizing specific elements or a complete system of 
performance measurement. This operationalization comprises a stage of adoption and another 
of instrumental action (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001). The adoption stage refers to the 
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development of ‘capacity to act’ – including the development or refinement of measures and 
the elaboration of how the different aspects of the PMS are expected to unfold. The 
instrumental action or system-in-use stage refers to the roll-out of the different components of 
the PMS. This stage has two essential elements: a technical element that involves 
operationalizing the tools, technologies and supporting information backbone; and an 
organizational element that involves personnel putting the system into practice (also, 
Jaaskelainen & Sillanpaa, 2013). 
Thus, the questions afforded by PMS implementation will include what to measure, 
why, how and by who; as well as how the ensuing information is to be interpreted and 
communicated (Fryer et al., 2009). And each of these questions will present dilemmas for the 
organizational actors. For example, regarding what to measure, the multi-faceted nature of the 
public sector often presents challenges in developing and defining indicators (Moynihan, 
2008), and in choosing the most appropriate (Kennerly & Neely, 2002). Then again, the ‘how’ 
questions require that the ‘what’ question has been clarified, that the data sources and manner 
of collection are clearly defined, and that the assumptions underlying the ‘why’ are clear (Fryer 
et al., 2009).  
Much of the performance measurement literature conceptualizes performance 
measurement and PMS implementation in this manner. An implicit assumption in this 
conceptualization is that of order, that is, the existence of clear desired outcomes, structured 
stages between the current and the desired state, and clearly identifiable cause-and-effect 
relationships (Snowden, 2005). Assumptions underpinning this perspective of order are that 
the essential properties of measurement are straightforward and can thus be taken for granted, 
and that there is no cognitive disagreement among the actors regarding the definition of the 
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situation (Micheli & Mari, 2014). Thus, individuals need only know the what, who, how, where 
and when, and the system would run as intended, yielding consistent results as expected. This 
perspective is captured by Bourne and colleagues (2000) who state that “(performance 
measurement) implementation is primarily a mechanistic exercise and should be susceptible to 
being managed by classic project management tools” (p.767). Exemplars of this philosophy 
include accounting-based systems such as Activity-Based Costing (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987) 
and others such as the Performance Pyramid (Cross & Lynch, 1992) and the Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1996).  
Given the limited recognition of the role of cognition in this conceptualization, 
attendant research has likewise inordinately focused on the technical elements of performance 
measurement i.e., on the development of tools, frameworks and procedures, and on their 
critique or support (Micheli & Mari, 2014). This perspective however raises several problems. 
First, the assumption of order has led researchers in PMPS to inordinately focus on functions 
that have order, and on the structure and design of processes that ensure repeatability and 
consistency. Failure of the PMS is seen as a failure of design (hence necessitating change from 
one framework to another) or of know-how (hence requiring training or more knowledgeable 
actors), but not as arising from the very nature of the system within which it is made operable 
(whether ordered or unordered), or from the complexity inherent in human or social interaction 
during implementation.  
Yet the public sector can be more often characterized as un-ordered rather than ordered. 
Such un-ordered settings accommodate multiple actors with multiple and varied interactions 
such that cause-and-effect relationships are not clearly identifiable or repeatable, nor are 
outcomes predictable except in the most general terms (Moynihan, 2008; Snowden, 2005). The 
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health public sector that is characterized by frequently shifting contexts, multiple stakeholder 
involvement and high levels of ambiguity regarding process and outcomes is an apt example. 
Extant research that has taken on a predominantly ordered perspective downplays the subtleties 
and complexities inherent in such unordered settings. 
Furthermore, not enough attention is given to the idea that the process of performance 
measurement in the public sector can relate to both physical objects (e.g., number of clients 
served), and socially constructed objects (e.g., patient satisfaction). These socially constructed 
objects are often ‘complex and difficult to define and measure in their properties’ (Micheli & 
Mari, 2014: 152), thus leaving room for varied interpretations and negotiation on their 
meaning. Moreover, the goals of the PMS and the constraints impinging on its implementation 
may be unclear or fuzzy. In this sense, a fuzzy goal or a fuzzy constraint imply an objective or 
a constraint that can exist anywhere along a grade of membership ranging from non-
membership to full membership (Bellman & Zadeh, 1970). For example, ‘substantial 
improvement in patient well-being’ is a fuzzy goal, while ‘between one and two percentage 
points’ is a fuzzy constraint. Additionally, even where the goals are presumably clear, the PMS 
sponsors and designers may have varied understandings, assumptions and expectations about 
performance measurement that are explicitly or implicitly built into the PMS, and which may 
be at odds with those of the implementers (Fryer et al., 2009; Micheli & Mari, 2014). 
Consequently, it is possible to examine PMS implementation as a series of decisions 
preceding action, which is interpenetrated by diverse values, legitimations and pressures 
(Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006; Dalehite, 2008; Pollitt, 2013). This approach acknowledges the 
centrality of the human actor in the PMS implementation process, recognizes the messiness of 
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their interactions in the search for focus and alignment, and allows for the construction of 
models that amply accommodate the interrelationships between people, process and context. 
Accordingly, we review the seminal models developed by Mintzberg, Raisinghani and 
Theoret (1976), Glueck (1976) and Mazzolini (1981), to derive a simplified PMS decision 
model whose stages are: PMS decision-need recognition and definition, the generation and 
consideration of PMS alternatives, choice selection and approval, and instrumental 
performance measurement action. The first three stages in this model represent processes 
involved in De Lancer Julnes and Holzer’s (2001) PMS adoption, while the last – instrumental 
action – represents PMS-in-use. Table 2.1 presents an abbreviated comparison of the models. 
Table 2.1 The decision-making models 
Glueck (1976) Mintzberg et al. 
(1976) 


















Search for answers 













courses of action, 





Implementation - Implementation Instrumental PMS 
action and feedback 
loops 
PMS-in-use 
 Evaluation - - 
 
Decision-need recognition refers to the awareness of problems or opportunities arising 
from an appreciation of difference between the current state and some expected standard, and 
which then evokes decisional activity (Mintzberg et al., 1976). On the other hand, definition 
relates to attempts to better understand the evoking stimuli and to reframe the issue of concern 
while determining likely cause-effect relationships (Mintzberg et al., 1976; Mazzolini, 1981). 
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In public sector performance measurement, the triggering stimulus can arise from ongoing 
benchmarking, from an active search for opportunities, or as a reaction to crises and problems 
(Rautiainen & Jarvenpaa, 2012). Equally, the definition stage will involve the explicit and 
formal or implicit or informal mobilization of diverse channels of information to clarify and 
define the issues (Mintzberg et al., 1976; Mazzolini, 1981). 
The next stage involves the active or passive search for alternatives through internal 
(individualized) or externalized discourse. Whereas passive search involves the emergence of 
unsolicited alternatives, active search may include scanning personal or organizational 
memory, or the direct seeking of alternatives including activation of internal and/or external 
actors and personal or collaborative reflection on the design of custom-made solutions 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976).  
The third stage in the derived decision model involves an iterative and recursive 
mélange of three closely intertwined processes – the screening of PMS alternatives, selection 
and approval. Screening reduces the number of alternatives for consideration while selection 
involves evaluation of these few against preset criteria. Approval on the other hand 
encompasses ratification of the choice made, which then paves the way for the final stage - 
instrumental action. 
Conceptualized in this way, we are thus able to examine both the process motor that 
powers the PMS implementation decision sequences, and the socially-constructed realities that 
temper the ongoing process, to provide an account of how cause and effect relationships may 




2.2.2 Situating the literature on institutional logics  
Organizations are a product of their institutional environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 
and as such, the institutional lens provides a useful theoretical tool for their examination. The 
theory of institutional logics specifically places emphasis on the cognitive dimensions of 
institutions and allows for active agency among the actors (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
This is aligned with a major premise of social cognitive research wherein people act based on 
their interpretations of the world (Gioia, 1984; Kahneman, 2012). Moreover, the 
conceptualization of performance measurement as an epistemic and pragmatic process 
(Micheli & Mari, 2014) requires that due consideration is paid to the influence of interpretive 
models such as institutional logics on the measurer. 
Early institutional research on performance measurement however tended to view 
organizational actors as mere “carriers of institutional processes” (Scott, 2001, p.79), and 
focused on decoupling or loose coupling of performance measurement practices, while later 
research focused on active agency and on the actor’s purposive responses to institutional 
pressures (Modell, 2009). Empirical evidence of these diametrically opposite positions 
presented researchers with a paradox: how could actors be constrained by the very institutions 
that they influence and/or change at will? Here, the conceptualization of organizations as 
inhabited by actors who not only ‘enact preconscious scripts’, but also ‘make sense of and 
interpret institutional vocabularies’ that ‘emerge from their professional commitments, 
personal interests and interactional on-the-ground decision making’ to guide their actions and 
interactions (Binder, 2007, p.548), provided a mechanism for accommodating individuals and 
their interactions under these paradoxical conditions.  
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Organizational actors thus neither unquestioningly follow institutionalized scripts nor 
purely rationalize their action (Everitt & Levinson, 2016). Instead, in attempting to satisfy 
multiple demands, and in interaction with other organizational actors, they may enact 
institutional scripts as prescribed, or may combine them in creative ways to generate hybrid, 
novel or unexpected practices (Binder, 2007; Modell, 2015). Thus, this agency implicitly 
assumes a range of probable relationships between actors and institutions, and accommodates 
a spectrum of actor action – from passivity and routine re-enactment to active agentic action. 
It also assumes intentionality and ingenious effort within institutional structures that both 
enable and constrain such action (also, Lampel, Honig & Drori 2011; Walker et al., 2014). 
Ingenuity in this sense is conceptualized as innovative activity within a constraining structural 
(institutional) environment by means of imaginative problem solving (Lampel et al., 2011, 
p.458). Institutional logics influence this agency by structuring organizational actor 
experiences, facilitating interpretations and providing a basis for action (Orlikowski, 1992, 
2000; Lawrence et al., 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013).  
Finally, in the analysis of PMS implementation in the public sector through an 
institutional lens, we are alive to the tension between top-down and bottom up processes. PMS 
are often introduced in a top down manner, while responsibility for implementation is heavier 
at the bottom (Scott, 2001). We address this paradox by acknowledging that all actors in the 
organization, irrespective of hierarchy, can be and are often engaged in implementation work 
(see also Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Sabatier, 1998). And all, bar none, are subject to the 
influences of institutional logics.  
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2.3 Developing the model: Institutional logics and performance measurement as 
decision-making 
From the review and synthesis of the literature on performance measurement, decision making 
and institutional logics we derive the following model, presented as Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Institutional logics and PMS implementation as decision making 
 
 
In this representation, the primary relationships first suggest that institutional logics 
filter the perception of the PMS by the organizational actors. These perceptions are made 
manifest during organizational discourse, where deliberations are further moderated by other 
societal institutional logics and by technical, pragmatic and contextual considerations. The 
deliberations result in an organization-level decision to act. Though closely intertwined, the 
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elements between the coordinating event and the decision to act are separated in this model to 
facilitate discussion. Instrumental action is depicted as deriving from the organizational-level 
decision to act moderated by the actor’s values; while feedback loops are shown to recursively 
affect all the hypothesized decision steps.   
2.3.1 Introducing the PMS: institutional logics as perceptual filters in PMS decision-need 
recognition 
Decision-need recognition and definition involves the identification of problems or gaps 
against a predetermined threshold, the determination of alternative actions and the 
identification of information necessary to commence the process of problem solving 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976; Mazzolini, 1981). PMS decision-need recognition and definition has 
similar concerns. Thus, the PMS decision-making situation will encompass the decisional 
problem (e.g., choice of PMS, order or ranking), and a set of alternatives, with each alternative 
representing a possible action for decision-making (Kornyshova & Deneckere, 2012). The 
interpretation of decisional problems has however been shown to vary between decision-
makers (Mintzberg et al., 1976). These differences have been traced to the decision-maker’s 
expectations and beliefs (Kozielecki, 1981) which are in turn anchored on their frame of 
reference at the time of perceiving the problem. Institutional logics are one such frame of 
reference. 
These institutional logics exist within the societal system, and organizational actors are 
exposed to them through the processes of learning and socialization (Smets et al., 2012). Thus, 
institutional logics may be ‘brought into the organization’ by actors who, ‘as participants in 
broader social discourses and institutions’ (Suddaby et al. 2010, p.1235), may transpose their 
referent logics into the organization (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Pollitt, 2013). Institutional logics 
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instantiated in organizations may also derive from ab initio theorizing (Ocasio et al., 2015), 
from successful, ideologically-motivated experimentation (Knocke, 1982), and from the 
imitation of organizations dominating that environment, including mimicking the PMS of 
donor governments or agencies to gain legitimacy and win their support (Bitektine & Haack, 
2015).  
Public sector organizations therefore frequently accommodate more than one 
institutional logic (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). Moreover, a distinct ‘organizational logic’ may 
develop as an amalgam of individual institutional logics (Seo & Creed, 2002). This amalgam 
may exist in a relatively stable equilibrium with the temporal acceptance of a dominant 
institutional logic (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995), or as a combination of institutional logics 
coexisting in a stable collaborative fashion (Purdy & Gray, 2009), in a state of competitive 
dynamic tension (Pollitt, 2013) or of temporal dominance (Seo & Creed, 2002; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009), or in a territorial manner within the organization (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Dunn 
& Jones, 2010). In the public sector, Skelcher and Smith (2015) propose plural institutional 
logics taking on segmented, segregated, assimilated, blended or blocked hybrid forms. Over 
time, this hybrid or amalgamated ‘organizational logic’ may even take on a life of its own 
complete with built-in maintenance mechanisms (Thornton & Ocasio 2008; Skelcher & Smith, 
2015). Such ‘organizational logics’ are nevertheless ideational and capable of being 
assimilated and acted upon by organizational actors (Seo & Creed, 2002; Skelcher & Smith, 
2015).  
The diverse institutional logics described above provide organizational actors with 
different frames of reference that structure their perception and interpretation of issues and 
events (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) including how they perceive and interpret PMS decisional 
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problems. For example, Guven-Uslu and Conrad’s (2008) analysis of benchmarking in NHS 
Trusts reveals variations in the meaning of the term ‘benchmarking’ for different groups in the 
same organization. For accountants, benchmarking meant comparative cost measures, while 
for clinicians benchmarking meant learning from scientifically-proven best practice and not 
cost comparation.  
Thus, following Bettis and Prahalad (1995), an actor’s referent institutional logic can 
be conceptualized as a frequency whose ‘bandwidth’ is ‘a measure of the tightness of the 
constraints imposed’ (p.8). The ability to expand ones understanding of a PMS will require an 
increase of the bandwidth (i.e., relaxing of the constraints) or tuning to a different band, ergo 
a different institutional logic. Consequently, logic multiplicity will provide the institutional 
foundations for variety in the cognitive orientation of organizational actors regarding what can 
be considered a legitimate response to the PMS decisional problem at entry (Bertels & 
Lawrence, 2016). Thus, selective perception occasioned by ones’ referent logic will lead to the 
selection of alternatives (from the ‘set of possible constructions’) that are most flattering to 
one’s position, and the rejection or non-consideration of those that are not.  
Proposition 1: Organizational actors will show greater support for PMS when its 
intended use aligns with the norms and expectations of their dominant or referent 
institutional logic 
There are however, contextual constraints to the influence of institutional logics on 
organizational actor perception. For example, the accessibility of constructs in an actor’s 
cognition is influenced by their context, through the processes of priming, that is, the 
nonconscious activation of cognitive structures by environmental cues such as images or text 
(Kahneman, 2012). Moreover, the introduction of a new PMS may bring with it external 
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normative pressures concerning how organizational units or actors should behave (Radin, 
1998; Rautiainen & Jarvenpaa, 2012). Consequently, a PMS could unambiguously favor all 
institutional logics, favor some or favor none. Or the PMS could be ambiguous about one or 
several logics, hence leaving room for actor discretion regarding how they interpret the PMS. 
Thus, context will not only prime institutional logics, but through this priming action as well 
as independent of it, will limit the alternatives available to the actor for consideration. 
Proposition 2: Environmental cues such as text or imagery will (nonconsciously) prime 
the institutional logics that will consequently anchor the perspectives of the 
organizational actor regarding the PMS decisional problem   
2.3.2 Institutional logics and organizational discourse on performance measurement 
Following the PMS decision-need recognition and definition, alternatives to the questions 
afforded by its introduction must be generated and considered. In this regard, we are alive to 
the wide scope for tensions between the institutional logics drawn upon by the different actors 
(Talbot, 2008). Thus, depending on the perspective embraced by the referent institutional logic, 
performance measurement may be supported or contested in toto or in part (Talbot, 2008; 
Moynihan, 2008; Moynihan et al., 2011). And so, organizational discourse, whose role is 
central in developing shared intentionality, will be the means through which these questions 
and others afforded by the PMS are re-interpreted and answered by the organizational actors 
as they seek to coordinate their activities (Moynihan et al., 2011; Bertels & Lawrence, 2016).  
During such discourse, actors will draw on their referent institutional logics to frame 
the PMS issue, to legitimate their preferences, and to structure their rhetoric to persuade others 
(Ocasio et al., 2015). Persuasion may however require several discourses, and readiness to 
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provide concessions (Callon, 1986). Accordingly, actors may draw on different logics to create 
new interpretations, options and solutions (Shrivastava et al., 1987). They may also combine 
logics by importing understandings from one into another (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets et 
al., 2015). And, they may selectively adopt and deploy institutional logics to legitimize and 
mobilize political action against incommensurate logics (Seo & Creed, 2002; Reay & Hinings, 
2009). Moreover, the greater the ambiguity in the PMS, the greater the chances for 
discretionary interpretation. And so, throughout this process, there is likely displacement and 
transformation of (PMS) goals and interests (Townley, 2002; Battilana et al., 2009) as actors 
and coalitions seek to impose their logic on others while protecting their own (Seo & Creed, 
2002; Purdy & Gray, 2009). Moreover, the constellation of actors may change, and as they 
change they may bring with them new ways of thinking, which may be consonant or conflicting 
with what was already there (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Talbot, 2008). 
We thus identify two concurrent discourse processes acting in tandem – an internal 
self-reflective process based on the emerging discourse on the PMS, and the interrogation and 
filling-in of gaps in one’s logic about the PMS (Quattrone, 2015); and an external political 
process based on mobilization of accumulated resources to defend one’s own or to challenge 
other logics (Modell, 2015). We believe these concurrent discourses are closely intertwined. 
Furthermore, our analysis of the literature reveals that where there is close alignment between 
individuals and groups to a specific position (on PMS implementation for example), enrolment 
to one’s position may happen without resistance; otherwise it may only be achieved through 
force, seduction or transaction (Callon, 1986).  
However, as the organizational actors compete in an arena in which the means and ends 
of their interests and agency are both enabled and constrained by the prevailing institutional 
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logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), they are unlikely to introduce logics of performance 
measurement that are unfamiliar to other participants, as doing so would make it difficult to 
gain consensus and support. Rather, they are more likely to adopt a frame or set of frames that 
is ‘sufficiently incompatible with the existing institutional arrangements to generate a 
fundamental departure from the past while also sufficiently resonant with those in existence to 
mobilize support and resources from other participants’ (Seo & Creed, 2002, p.236). 
Additionally, the gravitation of actors toward a conception of the PMS may include the path-
dependent use of older solutions that they are accustomed to regardless of whether these ever 
worked or whether they can be reasonably expected to work in this new setting (Gersick & 
Hackman, 1990). These previous or existing practices may not only be used as ‘anchors’ in the 
evaluation of other PMS alternatives, they may even preclude their consideration (Shrivastava 
et al., 1987; Modell et al., 2007). 
Moreover, given the organizational context and discourse dynamics, and the social 
position, roles and power wielded by varied actors in the discourse, some actors may choose 
to express certain views and to suppress others (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Clemente & Roulet, 
2015), particularly if they consider those views to be socially unacceptable or counter to the 
emerging organization stance, or if they have reason to anticipate sanctions for deviant 
judgment expression (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). Thus, the higher the resources commanded 
by an actor, the greater their power over the course of the discourse, and the more likely their 
interest will be given preeminence (Lansiluoto et al., 2013). And conversely, the more likely 
certain views may be suppressed. Self-reflection as a form of internal discourse may also be 
tempered by the same social acceptability constraints (Modell, 2015). These social and self-
imposed constraints may thus provoke a spiral of silence in which observed organizational 
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consensus may give the appearance of resolution while concealing privately-held-yet-
suppressed proprietary judgments (Clemente & Roulet, 2015).  
The feasibility of a harmonious PMS approach will thus depend on the dynamics of the 
organizational discourse. If organizational discourse is successful, there is unity of voice and 
purpose and action (Callon, 1986). Contrariwise, discordance arising from the various 
inconsistences and contradictions in and between institutional logics may be implicit and 
suppressed, or explicit and generative of a feedback loop, since it questions the processes and 
outcomes of the previous steps.  
Proposition 3: Latent tensions between institutional logics concerning performance 
measurement will become salient during organizational discourse on PMS change 
Proposition 4: Conflicts and inconsistencies between institutional logics regarding 
performance measurement will provoke a redefinition of actor roles and relational 
boundaries in PMS implementation 
Proposition 5: Actors who straddle different institutional domains, or whose logic 
encompasses dialectical tensions between other logics, will more likely accept the 
tensions brought on by a change in, or introduction of, a new PMS 
2.3.3 Institutional logics and the organizational decision to act 
For a PMS to deliver as intended, it must be purposeful, unified, integrated and fluid (Fryer et 
al., 2009). And to arrive at this consensus approach, choices will have to be made based on 
political, subjective and technical considerations (Pollitt, 2013). These decisions and choices 
take on added importance in the public sector considering the diversity of actors that Pollitt 
(2013) identifies as core to performance management. They include politicians (ministers, 
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legislature), top officials and technocrats in the civil service, and operational staffs, all with 
potentially different motivations to engage in performance measurement, and a varied 
cognitive grasp of its technicalities (Pollitt, 2013; also, Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Radin, 
2000). 
As what gets done is the result of a negotiated process (Zilber, 2007), the different 
strategies employed by the actors during discourse will influence the decision outcomes 
regarding the PMS (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013). This decision outcome will thus be dependent 
on the participants in the discourse, the climate of participation, and the external normative 
pressures introduced by the PMS concerning how units or individuals within the organization 
should behave (Greenwood et al., 2011; Rautiainen & Jarvenpaa, 2012). And the criteria 
considered by these diverse actors when evaluating alternative courses of action may differ in 
their assigned weights, that is, their relative importance from the perspective of the decision-
maker (Kornyshova & Deneckere, 2012) as influenced by their referent institutional logics. 
Moreover, the decision-makers may have different preferences (defined as wishful values 
according to given needs), and different thresholds or levels of acceptability (Kornyshova & 
Deneckere, 2012). These preferences and degrees of acceptability will be further determined 
by the decision-makers tastes and beliefs that draw from their referent institutional logics.  
Thus, the comparison of PMS alternatives will consider alignment or misalignment 
with logic-influenced preferences and thresholds. The threshold values determine 
consideration and action – whether support, indifference or veto. And so, to meet these 
potentially diverse expectations regarding the PMS, the organizational decision-to-act 
resulting may include acquiescence (Oliver, 1991), and avoidance through loose coupling or 
decoupling (Chang, 2006). The decision-to-act could also include sagacious conformity or 
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compromise (Rautiainen & Jarvenpaa, 2012), resistance (Townley, 1997), deflection or 
manipulation of the sources of pressure to enact the PMS (Oliver, 1991; Ashworth et al., 2007), 
defiance (Oliver, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008) and compartmentalization (Dunn & Jones, 2010; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 2013).  
All these choices arise from the contestation between logics and reflect the degree to 
which some form of consensus is achieved. Thus, disconnect between the actors’ referent 
institutional logics and organizational desires regarding the introduced PMS can lead to any of 
the forms of gaming referred to above, or to inaction or half-hearted action (Radnor & 
McGuire, 2004; Andrews & Martin, 2007). Structure constrains the relationship between 
institutional logics and the organizational decision to act on several fronts. In the first instance, 
it imposes the need to balance expectations with avoidance of the social costs associated with 
violation of others (Thornton et al., 2012). Additionally, the results of organizational 
discourses act as a form of social control, putting pressure on individual actors to conform to 
the consensus PMS implementation decision (Neuwirth & Frederick, 2004; Kim, 2012).  
Proposition 6: The collective decision will reflect the degree of congruence between 
the consensus organizational logic that is the result of negotiation and reconciliation 
of the norms and values associated with individual logics, and the PMS, moderated by 
pragmatic concerns  
2.3.4  Institutional logics and instrumental performance measurement action 
Organizations are known to have ‘pockets of discretion and autonomy and local ecologies of 
power and influence’ (Binder, 2007). The reflective purposefulness of organizational actors 
(Zilber, 2013), underpinned by their referent institutional logics, their values and explicit 
 43 
 
rational considerations, will therefore determine whether they ultimately support or resist 
organizational positions within these ‘pockets of discretion and autonomy’ (Goodrick & 
Salancik, 1996; Lawrence et al., 2013). As a result, despite coming to organizational consensus 
on what action to take, PMS may not be implemented as intended partly due to the disconnect 
between the consensus logic and individually held logic, and the effect of privately-held yet 
suppressed judgments that draw from their individual values (Ashworth et al., 2007; Bitektine 
& Haack, 2015). Consistent with Leys (1962), we define values as deeply held frames of 
reference existing at the level of the individual (Leys, 1962). And they are partly endogenous 
even though they draw from and are probably tightly linked to exogenous sources (Yang & 
Modell, 2012). Prior institutional research has not fully appreciated this distinction between 
values and institutional logics, the latter of which are largely exogenous in origin, and may or 
may not be as deeply held (Yang & Modell, 2012). Values are thus more resistant to influence 
and change (Rokeach, 1973).  
And so, whereas individuals are not independent of organizational expectations, 
misalignment may occur because of individual idiosyncrasies drawing from their individually-
held institutional logics and their values (Yang & Modell, 2012). Put differently, actors are 
unlikely to subordinate or change their values to altruistically accept organizational direction 
- unless the latter fall within their own ‘zone of values’ (Paarlberg & Perry, 2007). Value 
conflicts are thus part of the story of public management and they occur in situations where 
organizational actors are unable ‘to dis-embed their actions from their values and beliefs when 
confronted with their institutional environment’ (Yang & Modell, 2012, p.105). For example, 
Yang and Modell (2012), observe the challenges faced by a local government department head 
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in keeping her internalized beliefs and values aligned with institutionalized expectations, 
because of her ‘relative value rigidity’.  
Thus, since frontline action is dependent on the degree of congruence between actor 
values and individual logics, and the organizational decision (Ashworth et al., 2007), where 
there is congruence we expect reasonably similar interpretations of the PMS and concordant 
behavior (Gioia & Sims, 1986; Isabella, 1990). For example, Chang (2006) found that in 
complex public settings with more than one powerful actor, local managers tended to act in 
line with the constituent’s interest that was most compatible with their own. Accordingly, 
where there is less congruence we expect implementation difficulties including deviant 
behavior (Bitektine & Haack, 2015), or in a best-case scenario, some degree of loose coupling 
or decoupling (Andrews & Martin, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
Furthermore, frontline performance measurement action is likely to be influenced by 
the actor’s implicit loss aversion i.e., whether the desired action and its outcome will yield a 
net gain or loss (Kahneman, 2012), and explicit consideration of sanction/reward for 
deviant/concordant behavior (Bitektine & Haack, 2015) as self-regulatory mechanisms. Self-
regulation may thus act as a moderator placing social conscience, social acceptance and 
pragmatic concerns before individual impulse, thus helping prevent action regarding PMS 
implementation that may be initially beneficial to the actor but costly in the long run (Chang, 
2006).  
Proposition 7: The commitment of the organizational actor to the implementation of 
the PMS will vary according to the degree of compatibility between the collective 




2.3.5 Context and institutional logics 
The role of context in public sector performance measurement has not been comprehensively 
examined and empirical work remains thin and fragmented (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006). Yet 
when members of an organization act on any aspect of performance measurement, they do so 
within its contextual setting (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006). Here, by context we refer to the 
performance measurement decision environment. We are thus concerned with elements that 
may influence the perspective of the organizational actors or otherwise influence their 
judgment and action regarding the PMS.  
Thus, the literature reveals that organizational configurations matter (Moynihan et al., 
2011; Talbot, 2008). For example, Talbot (2008) presents configurations based on Wilson’s 
(1989) typology of public agencies, as well as Mintzberg’s (1983) typology of a machine 
bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy or adhocracy, as interacting differently with the same 
PMS. Additionally, organizational decision-making may be fragmented with separate units of 
varying degrees of autonomy responsible for different aspects of PMS implementation (Radin, 
1998, 2000; Moynihan et al., 2011). These units will be populated by diverse individuals, thus 
representing perspectives that are probably differentially aligned to performance measurement 
and the proposed PMS course of action (Radin, 1998, 2000). Furthermore, in some public 
organizations, there is a tendency to conflate planning, budgeting and performance 
management (Radin, 2000). Yet these are complex functions in and of themselves. Moreover, 
the individuals tasked with each of these functions have their own logic-influenced 
perspectives, preferences and interests. Thus Radin (2000) observes striking differences 
between the federal management and workforce issues staff, and the budget issues staff in their 
approaches to tasks related to the implementation of the American Government Performance 
46 
 
and Results Act. The former emphasized a ‘centralized, control approach’, while the latter 
focused on ‘institutional constraints’ (Radin, 2000, p.126). 
The external social context also matters. Given that discursive struggles usually occur 
in parallel in the wider societal and narrower public sector spheres, one can reasonably expect 
societal-level institutional logic to exert influence on organizational PMS discourse when such 
societal logic is co-opted as individual and organizational frames of reference (Clemente & 
Roulet, 2015). For example, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) find the formulation and 
implementation of the UK NHS star-rating PMS to have been greatly influenced by political 
targets. The greater the degree of social, professional, economic and political connectedness, 
the greater the likelihood of adoption of societal institutional logics and of standardization 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Orlikowski & Gash, 1993; Meyer et al., 1997). This hypothesized 
link may partially explain why PMS in public sector organizations reflect both global and 
national social forms (Meyer et al., 1997; Drori et al., 2006). 
The influence of these external influences is nonetheless likely to depend on the 
organizations sensitivities to what is going on ‘out there’. For example, a public organization 
may be embedded in such a way that it is more exposed to the tensions between multiple logics, 
as would be the case for health sector organizations that bestride multiple institutional logics 
(Seo & Creed, 2002). The public organization may also be more visible than other actors 
because of its ‘status, resources, size and media attention’, and thus be more sensitive to certain 
logics because ‘it is being watched’ (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
The sensitivities of organizations to what is going on ‘out there’ may also explain the 
enactment of a PMS to signal legitimacy (see also Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). These sensitivities may include the pragmatic considerations of interested and agentic 
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actors keen to see their units or organization survive and thrive in contexts where their 
dependence on external actors demands it (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Yang & Hsieh, 
2007; Eliuz et al., 2017). Chang (2006) for example notes that given their dependencies on the 
central government, local public sector managers are more likely to acquiesce to coercive 
institutional pressures imposed by central government to preserve their jobs, reputations and 
funding for their operations. Such managers are also less likely to interrogate proposed PMS 
changes, and consensus building with them and their subordinates is more likely to be reduced 
to quasi-participation (Chang, 2006). 
Thus, though the organizational actor is partially autonomous from the context in which 
they exist, their awareness is concurrently influenced by the very context (Kahneman, 2012). 
This sets the stage for diverse context-dependent interpretations and potential agential action. 
The organizational actor may thus apply an institutional logic in one setting and not another – 
a process referred to as segmenting (Smets et al. 2015) or compartmentalizing (Dunn & Jones, 
2010). Similarly, a prevailing climate of organizational crisis may foment discontent with the 
current arrangements thus raising prospects for the emergence, consideration of, and actor 
receptiveness toward specific PMS alternatives.  
Public sector actors are thus political actors with myriad relationships with each other, 
with society and with their political principals (Talbot, 2008). Contextual factors such as the 
legal context, organizational and political realities provide the boundary posts within which 
their referent institutional logics are instantiated (Seo & Creed, 2002; Chang, 2006). And they 
affect how the organizational actor’s consciousness will unfold, making other options 
unimaginable or un-actionable while concurrently enabling the unfolding of PMS 
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implementation in a manner reflective of global and national social forms (Meyer et al., 1997; 
Drori et al., 2006).  
Proposition 8: The greater the degree of organizational, social, professional, economic 
and political connectedness, the greater the likelihood of PMS adoption and/or 
standardization  
2.3.6 The reflexive dimension: Feedback loops and organizational learning 
Organizational actors are more than ‘mere carriers of institutions’ (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). 
They can reflect, that is, think about their own thinking as well as that of others (Micheli & 
Mari, 2014). And they can engage in agential activity advocating for the legitimacy of certain 
positions in some situations, yet challenge the same legitimacy in others (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006). Moreover, the institutional logics they draw from are often internally 
inconsistent, accommodating ideas that are ambiguous, obsolete, incomplete or incorrect 
(Quattrone, 2015). The outcome of PMS discourse, rooted in the mobilization of different 
logics, may thus cause further fragmentation and variety in institutional arrangements 
(Lounsbury, 2008; Ocasio et al., 2015) including how they relate to performance measurement. 
The ensuing legitimation of PMS implementation may arise from this purposeful action and 
conscious sense-making; or from inaction, as actors fail to counter given positions either out 
of a lack of interest or a failure to define and offer acceptable alternatives (Everitt & Levinson, 
2016).  
In addition, the performance measurement discourse, the decision to act, and 
instrumental action are permanently observed by organizational actors, decoded and 
interpreted. Action and outcomes are evaluated against expectations from whence they may 
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serve to reinforce, or lead to a questioning of, the decisions made, the action taken and the 
underlying institutional logic. Radcliffe and Heath (2009) for example note that whereas 
government policy embodied in the modernization agenda reinforced, and was reinforced by, 
changing practice on the ground; performance indicators and aspects of organizational culture 
were similarly reinforcing each other. And so, reflexivity is a core concept in PMS 
implementation in the public sector. Drawing from Archer (2007), we conceptualize reflexivity 
as the mental ability of organizational actors to consider themselves and their practices in 
relation to their social context, and concurrently, to consider their social context in relation to 
themselves and their desired or actual practices (see also, Modell, 2015). It is this reflective 
process that leads to the development of a personal strategy for action and consequently, 
agentic action (Modell, 2015). The absence of such reflexivity would imply that organizational 
actors are ‘structurally determined to reproduce dominant social orders’ (Modell, 2015, p.776).  
Thus, engendering reflexivity helps achieve a balance between agency and structure, 
with equal attention paid to both the social structures that condition action, as well as the 
reflexive process of individuals deliberating on their position regarding ‘objective referents out 
there’ (Archer, 2007; Modell, 2015). So, whereas institutional logics influence actor cognition 
and action about performance measurement, actor action is simultaneously observed and 
reflected upon. Thus, the outcomes of actor action in turn influence how these logics will be 
instantiated in future. This recursive relationship is at the core of organization learning and 
unlearning (Thornton et al., 2012), and contributes to the dynamism of the PMS 
implementation process.  
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2.4 Assumptions and boundary conditions  
Although the model depicts PMS implementation in the public sector as a series of decisions 
made at specific moments in time over which a course of action is selected, it does not prescribe 
a necessary sequence of events. Rather, the model admits greater complexity regarding causal 
agency by acknowledging the reflexivity of organizational actors while stressing their 
purposive movement toward implementation of the PMS as planned, despite potentially 
conflicting goals or interests. The model also acknowledges the limitations placed by context 
on actor actions. Thus, the model should be viewed as dynamic and non-linear, with feedback 
loops that vary in strength over time and depending on the situational context. Its depiction in 
such a simplistic manner is for ease of representation as well as an effect of the limitations of 
representing such complex relationships in two-dimensions. 
Additionally, several assumptions and boundary conditions limit this model. First, our 
discussion and inferences are limited to strategic rather than routine performance measurement 
issues. Strategic issues are characterized by novelty, ambiguity and uncertainty (Mintzberg et 
al., 1976), and have a significant behavioral component that is reflective of the idiosyncrasies 
of the decision-makers (March & Simon, 1958). This ties in with our conceptualization of 
public sector institutions as ‘inhabited by people and their doings’ (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006), 
and motivates our theorizing on PMS implementation as the result of interplay between 
individual actor agency and institutional structure (Thornton & Ocasio 1999, 2008). 
Second, to operationalize the model, we assume the location of public sector 
organizations in an inter-institutional system. Institutional logics emerge from the institutional 
orders of this system and provide organizational actors with a contingent set of norms 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). The diversity of these institutional 
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logics however engenders contradictions, and as ‘no institutional order is accorded causal 
primacy a priori’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008 p.104), we anticipate different realities of the same 
situation. Likewise, we assume the localization of the organizational actor in a social context 
characterized by free discussion and consideration of other’s needs (Langley et al., 1995). 
These assumptions motivate our theorization on diversity in actor perception, and on the 
dynamics of organizational discourse. 
Third, we take adherence to institutional logics to be probabilistic rather than 
deterministic, driven by both a logic of appropriateness and of consequences (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008). This assumption motivates our theorizing on how the relationship between 
institutional logics and organizational actor PMS perception and action changes with 
interaction and over time.  
And finally, given ‘institutional logics shape rational, mindful behavior, and individual 
and organizational actors have a hand in shaping and changing institutional logics’ (Thornton 
& Ocasio, 2008, p.100), we assume a mutually constitutive relationship between institutional 
logics and performance measurement implementation by organizational actors. This 
assumption motivates our theorizing on organizational learning and feedback. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The tone of the paper suggests our strong advocacy for a perspective that recognizes the 
decision-context and logic-influenced agency as mutually constitutive elements engaged in a 
perpetual tango in PMS implementation in public sector organizations. Consequently, we have 
built on the idea that performance measurement decisions are influenced by institutional logics 
that are both individually held and collectively shared.  
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Moreover, in combining institutional logics with performance measurement as 
decision-making, we recognize certain similarities in their ontologies and epistemologies, and 
consider them sufficient for us to combine them to analyze performance measurement 
implementation - akin to placing several focusing lenses in a microscope or telescope, to get a 
sharper view. Institutional theory is grounded in a social constructivist view of the world and 
institutional logics present human actors as institutionally embedded, drawing on diverse 
logics to understand their world and to give meaning to their actions (Modell, Vinnari & Lukka, 
2017). Similarly, latter conceptions of performance measurement are based on a social 
constructivist view (Micheli & Mari, 2014). Moreover, agency as embedded and bound by 
institutional constraints mirrors the conception of bounded rationality in the decision-making 
literature.  
However, despite this fresh approach, the paper has several limitations. First because 
of its breadth it has had to sacrifice depth. Second, by assuming the embeddedness of public 
sector organizations and organizational actors in well-defined institutional fields, the model 
may be best applied in established rather than emerging institutional fields. Third, the paper to 
a reasonable degree assumes that human action is intentional and that this intentional action 
reflects the actor’s goals, motivations and beliefs (Zilber, 2013), even though the frames of 
reference used may be implicit i.e. unbeknown to him (Kahneman, 2012). These limitations 
notwithstanding, the synthesis of relevant literature and the proposed model sets the stage for 
subsequent empirical testing that can only enrich our current understanding and help develop 
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CHAPTER 3  
DIFFERENT SHADES OF GREY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON HOW 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS INFLUENCE                  
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTOR PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT 
 
This chapter addresses the second research objective of this PhD thesis by empirically 
investigating whether and how institutional logics influence organizational actor perception 
and judgment in ambiguous situations such as those experienced in much of the public sector. 
The chapter has been has been submitted as a scientific paper for publication and has received 





Using an experimental design based on principles drawn from psychology, we prime three 
institutional logics in three independent groups of managers from the public and private sectors 
and assess their influence on judgment preferences. We find that the actors give 
recommendations aligned to their primed institutional logic, and that the profiles of their 
recommendations differ between priming conditions. Given the obscured nature of the priming 
manipulation, these findings suggest the nonconscious influence and constraining effects of 
institutional logics on actor perception and judgment. The findings further highlight the 
potential of text as priming stimuli within institutionally complex work settings as those in the 





Many authors (e.g. Coule & Patmore, 2013; Currie & Spyridonidis, 2016) suggest that 
difficulties and unanticipated outcomes in organizational action could be due to the differences 
in cognitive structures variously utilized by individuals and groups within the organization, 
whether public or private. Specifically, these cognitive structures, as ‘built up repertoires of 
assumptions, tacit knowledge and expectations’ (Gioia, 1986; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994) are 
used by individuals to ‘impose structure upon, and impart meaning to, otherwise ambiguous 
social and situational information to facilitate understanding’ (Gioia, 1986, p.56). And they 
influence both collective action as well as individual projects (Swan & Clark, 2008). 
Institutional logics, as one such cognitive structure, have been defined as ‘historical 
patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values and beliefs, 
by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time 
and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Institutional 
logics thus provide actors with the context from which they think, feel, view or otherwise 
experience the world (Ford & Ford, 1994). And they consequently influence their 
interpretation of the ambiguous world (Ford & Ford, 1994), and what reactional options are to 
be considered appropriate (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Thus, they affect the judgments 
made by individual and organizational actors (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012; Besharov 
& Smith, 2014), and the perception of such judgments’ appropriateness and legitimacy within 
a given setting (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  
Extant literature further emphasizes the multiplicity of these institutional logics (e.g., 
Besharov & Smith, 2014). Indeed, many authors align to Friedland and Alford’s (1991) 
original conceptualization of institutional logics as arising from the state, the professions, the 
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corporations, the market, the religions and the family (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). These logics 
and their various instantiations have nonetheless been observed at various levels – from the 
societal to the field and the organization - where individuals and organizations interact and 
thus encounter their multiplicity (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, 2012). Accordingly, we anticipate 
individuals and organizations to be variously influenced by the institutional logics they 
encounter in different environments (Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013).  
However, not much is known about how individuals experience these multiple 
institutional logics – hereinafter referred to as institutional complexity (Marti & Mair, 2009; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013), as the majority focus has been on the 
instantiation of institutional logics at the level of the field and organization rather than the 
individual (Bevort & Suddaby, 2016). As a result, this literature does not fully explain whether 
and how institutional pressures influence individual interpretations, and whether there are 
differences between individual interpretations and behavior, and cumulative organizational 
action (see also, Besharov & Smith, 2014). Exceptions that present conceptual and empirical 
efforts to bring the individual back into institutional theory include the sense-making literature 
typified by Hallett and Ventresca (2006) and the literature on institutional entrepreneurship 
(e.g., Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Much of this literature however implicitly assumes 
significant degrees of autonomy on the part of organizational actors (Martin et al., 2017) 
despite compelling research in cognitive and social psychology that suggests nonconscious 
processes operating alongside conscious thinking and reasoning (Loersch & Payne, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2012).  
This possibility of dual conscious-nonconscious influence by institutional logics has 
been suggested in the work and organizational behavior literature, but has not been adequately 
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examined. In brief, this literature postulates that organizational actors may ‘preconsciously 
enact institutional logics, rarely surfacing and reflecting upon them’ (Ford & Ford, 1994), or 
they may consciously and creatively use them to guide their decisions, actions and interactions 
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Everitt & Levinson, 2016). Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) 
conceptualized ‘nonconsciousness’ as ‘being unaware’, and we extend this definition to reflect 
default perception, judgment and action, that is replicated with relative ease outside of the 
actor’s conscious awareness or deliberate processing of information. Akin to other authors (e.g. 
Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), we posit 
such default actor perception and judgment and consequent action as exemplary of the taken-
for-grantedness nature, and cognitive embeddedness, of the institutional logics in use at the 
time perception, judgment and action is called for. This embeddedness is core to the 
institutional logics approach, and may partially explain how any decision (and action that 
ensues), is both enabled and constrained by the institutional logic within which it is embedded 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
Thus, in this study, we examine whether institutional logics can nonconsciously 
influence organizational actors and their ‘actor-hood’ (Suddaby et al., 2010). Our argument is 
that the perception, interpretation and judgment of organizational actors is colored by 
institutional logics as a referent decision-frame such that when presented with an ambiguous 
scenario, they will make default judgments, in a manner congruent to their referent institutional 
logic. We further argue that these institutional logics can be nonconsciously primed and made 
accessible as cognitive frames of reference by seemingly inconsequential cues such as text. 
Following Newell and Shanks (2014, p.4), we define priming as ‘the influence of prior stimuli 
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on later behavior (including attitudes, perspectives, choices, impressions, judgment or any 
other overt and observable act), without deliberate intent to influence them’. 
In seeking support for these arguments, we focus on three logics that confront 
organizational actors in the setting of interest: the public administration logic, the market-
managerial logic and the professional logic. There are several reasons for this choice of 
institutional logics. First, these logics are among the most diffuse in the health sector. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that the population of interest and the sample drawn from it have 
been exposed to them. Second, these three institutional logics are among the most researched. 
Thus, they and their various instantiations are reasonably well-defined in the literature (e.g., 
Thornton et al., 2012). Third, the study setting of interest - the health sector - straddles many 
other sectors, and has been the subject of multiple reforms. During these reforms, these three 
institutional logics have maintained their salience, distinctiveness and occasional antagonism 
(Scott et al., 2000; Reay & Hinings, 2005). The determination of whether and how 
organizational actor perception and judgment is influenced by these three institutional logics, 
in such fluid and ambiguous circumstances is thus of relevant concern for both practitioners 
and researchers.  
We consequently build on the work of earlier authors in developing the concept of 
institutional logics as frames of reference for the individual organizational actor. And we apply 
an experimental design hinged on priming and memory-based information processing to test 
this hypothesis. In revealing significant differences between the organizational actors’ 
perception and judgment depending on which institutional logic was primed, the results 
provide empirical support for the argument that the variations, difficulties and unanticipated 
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outcomes in organizational action could be due to the differences in the institutional logics 
accessed and utilized by individuals inhabiting the organization, in their own decision-making. 
Our study thus makes several contributions to institutional theory, and especially to its 
micro-foundations. First, by focusing on the organizational actor, we advance the growing 
body of micro-level research on institutional logics that examine the lived experiences of actors 
in the world of work as they navigate, interpret and translate institutional complexity. Second, 
much research on institutional logics has focused on the examination of two seemingly-
contrarian logics, while ignoring other logics that inhabit the same space and that may 
influence the interactions between the two under study (Scott, 2008). Our study moves away 
from this dualistic bias and responds to calls for research that more adequately accounts for 
institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Waldorff et al., 2013) without any 
presumptions of dominance, compatibility or contradiction (Thornton et al., 2012). Thus, with 
these two focus areas we address the linkages between organizational actors and the wider 
institutional context within which work is embedded. Third, we introduce a novel 
methodological approach that may be useful for the exploration of multiple logics as 
experienced by individual actors. Much earlier research was biased toward the use of 
comparative longitudinal analysis as a mechanism for understanding how actors experienced 
institutional logics (e.g., Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Waldorff et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2017). 
While these approaches have been extremely useful in helping understand collective responses 
to institutional complexity, their utility for micro-level analysis has been limited. The use of 
priming techniques, as we have experimented with in this study, opens new avenues for 
research (see also Perry, 2012) that may better explicate actor experiences under conditions of 
institutional complexity, including constraints to and enablers of their agency.   
 75 
 
This study also makes several contributions to the organizational behavior and human 
decision processes literature, and to public management - an institutionally complex arena. The 
role of institutional logics as a cognitive frame is yet untested in these literatures. This paper 
thus extends the work done by for example Ganegoda and Folger (2015) in empirically 
assessing cognitive biases in decision-making as opposed to decision making based on fixed 
criteria, and Swan and Clark (2008) on cognitive dimensions and organizational decision-
making. Additionally, by presenting the study participants with an ambiguous scenario, the 
study opens the space for assessing the influence of these cognitive frames under conditions 
allowing for possible counterfactual thinking – defined as mental representations of 
alternatives (Roese, 1997), which could arise from conscious and deliberate, or nonconscious 
(automatic) processing of information (Kahneman, 1995). This aspect has not been adequately 
considered in the organizational behavior or public management literature (Grimmelikhuijsen 
et al., 2017). Moreover, the rigor of the experiment and subsequent statistical analysis allows 
us to draw causal inference regarding the role of text – a common medium of communication 
in organizations - in priming institutional logics as referent cognitive frames, and of the 
influence of such frames on subsequent judgments and decisions. 
In the sections that follow, we provide a brief conceptual background. We then present 
our methods and results. Finally, we discuss novel insights arising from the study, as well as 
implications for research and practice. 
3.2 Conceptual background 
3.2.1 The phenomenology of institutional logics 
Whereas institutional logics were originally conceptualized at the societal level (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991), their iterations and influence have been identified at industry and organizational 
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levels (Thornton et al., 2012), and at departmental and unit levels within the organization 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014). Organizational actors are exposed to these multiple logics through 
the processes of learning and socialization (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Moreover, as each logic 
provides ‘a set of organizing principles for a realm of social life’ (Besharov & Smith, 
2014:366), we can reasonably assume that organizational actors have alternative ways of 
making sense of what they experience (Weick, 1979b; Ford & Ford, 1994; Martin et al., 2017).  
In this study, we focus on the logic of public administration, the market-managerial 
logic, and the logic of the professions, which have all been previously defined in the literature 
(e.g., Thornton et al., 2012). With the logic of public administration, government is perceived 
as the legitimate and sole provider of services (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Elected officials 
make decisions that public officials are then expected to implement (Denhardt & Denhardt, 
2000). Furthermore, emphasis is placed on rules and procedure (Hayes, Introna & Petrakaki, 
2014) to ensure that operations remain true to the ideals of equality, equity and transparency 
to the public (Meyer et al., 2014). This focus on rules and procedure, on strict accountability 
to the state (Meyer et al., 2014), and on hierarchical and jurisdictional demarcation (Hayes, 
Introna & Petrakaki, 2014), supports the reference to this logic as a bureaucracy. The focus on 
rules and procedure however seemingly detracts from discretionary action that could have 
yielded better results (Hyndman et al., 2014), and from efficiency and effectiveness (Hayes et 
al., 2014).  
The market-managerial logic on the other hand, combines market with managerial 
logic. Though initially conceived as separate, many researchers, conflate the market and 
managerial logics given their tendency to ‘blend and blur’ (Thornton et al., 2012). 
Underpinning this composite logic is management discretion, which involves giving 
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management prominence, and in contradistinction to public administration, the liberation of 
managers from burdensome rules and regulations (Olsen, 2009). Other ideas associated with 
this logic are accountability for performance and efficiency in resource use, and competition 
(Hayes et al., 2014).  
The third institutional logic of interest is that of the professions. Professions are key 
carriers of institutional logics (Thornton, Jones & Kury, 2005). Their legitimacy is strongly 
tied to the state, which plays a key role in their formation, employment and institutionalization 
(Light, 2000). This legitimacy is further strengthened by the ‘professionals’ specific 
knowledge and expertise, usually acquired over a long period of time (Thornton et al., 2012). 
Members of these professions usually form professional bodies that admit members, and 
structure and regulate professional practice (Noordegraaf, 2007). Service quality is thus 
strongly reliant on peer opinion (Reay & Hinings, 2005). Moreover, a high premium is placed 
on the autonomy of the professional, that is, his/her discretion in designing and managing 
his/her own work (Reay & Hinings, 2005). Correspondingly, the scope of practice, irrespective 
of the locale of the professional’s work, often reflects the desires of the professional association 
rather than that of their employer (Noordegraaf, 2007; Goodrick & Reay, 2011).   
Whereas a more detailed listing of the elements that characterize these three 
institutional logics is given in Appendix 1, their discussion here and in the Appendix, is more 
illustrative than exhaustive, given editorial constraints. More substantive discussions can be 
found in for example Thornton and Ocasio (2012), and Hyndman et al., (2014).  
And so, in the identification and elucidation of these three logics, we focused on the 
rich and carefully prepared descriptions provided by other authors e.g. Thornton and Ocasio 
(2012), and Hyndman et al., (2014). Our analysis was further underpinned by the recognition 
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that despite not existing as unified constitutions (also, Friedland & Alford, 1991), institutional 
logics nevertheless possess signature elements that can help tie the observable with their 
abstract conceptualizations (Meyer et al., 2014). Moreover, these elements can be extracted 
and used to demarcate and examine institutional logics and their relationships. This approach 
has been used by others e.g., Dunn and Jones (2010), and is the approach we take in this study.  
Consequently, to develop a more fine-grained understanding of how institutional logics 
influence individual organizational actor perception and judgment under conditions of 
institutional complexity, we draw on Weick (1979a, b) and Gioia’s (1986) notion of frames, 
which we explicate in the next section. 
3.2.2 Institutional logics as frames of reference, priming and information processing 
Based on the premise that individual’s act based on their interpretations of the world, Weick 
conceptualized frames as ‘implicit guidelines that shape interpretations, endowing them and 
related events and phenomena with meaning’ (Weick, 1979a, b). Gioia expanded this 
definition, conceptualizing an individual’s frame of reference as ‘a built-up repertoire of tacit 
knowledge that is used to impose structure upon, and impart meaning to, otherwise ambiguous 
social and situational information to facilitate understanding’ (1986: p.56). In this sense, 
frames structure the organizational actor’s experience based on established knowledge and 
assumptions, and provide a basis for acting. Similarly, Ford and Ford (1994), and Thornton 
and Ocasio (2008) posit institutional logics as providing individuals with rules and conventions 
for deciding which solutions get considered and which solutions get linked to what problems. 
Thus, each institutional logic, as a unique decision frame, will stress and increase the apparent 
relevance of different values, facts and other considerations than might have been under an 
alternative frame (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
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Nonetheless, drawing from memory-based models of information processing 
(Scheufele, 2000), we aver that to be utilized as a frame of reference, an institutional logic 
must be accessible in the individual’s cognition. Accessibility is here conceptualized as the 
ease with which relevant cognitive material is recalled (Scheufele, 2000), or made available 
and retrievable from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Priming – the use of external 
stimuli, is one mechanism through which cognitive frames of reference (such as institutional 
logics), can be made accessible (Bargh, 2006; Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006). Indeed, extant 
research has demonstrated that many psychological concepts such as goals and motives (e.g. 
Bargh et al., 2001), decisions and judgment (e.g. Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996), and behavior 
(Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006), may be primed by ‘seemingly inconsequential and logically 
irrelevant cues’ (Loersch & Payne, 2011, p.234). 
Moreover, in the organizational behavior and management literature, Salancik and 
Pfeffer’s social information processing approach seemingly refers to priming when they 
acknowledge the social environment as a provider of cues that ‘focuses an individual’s 
attention on certain information, making that information more salient, and providing 
expectations concerning individual behavior’ (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978, p.227). Thus, priming 
can be viewed as a precursor event that leads to the activation of a specific reference frame, 
giving it pre-eminence over other frames. Consequently, when a new concept is afterward 
presented, it is accordingly interpreted from within the activated frame (Scheufele, 2000). 
 And so, to connect the concepts of institutional logics, priming and information 
processing together, our foundational hypothesis is that the priming of specific logics makes 
the knowledge, expectations and assumptions of the primed logic more accessible and easier 
for the organizational actor to retrieve from memory, in comparison to those that have not been 
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primed. This now-accessible logic will be subsequently used by the organizational actor to 
answer questions afforded by the circumstance confronting them. This notion of affordances 
draws from Gibson (1977) and we conceptualize it to mean the possibilities for action provided 
by the environment (also, Loersch & Payne, 2011). 
There have been few, if any, attempts to apply the theoretical and practical concepts of 
priming and information processing in the understanding of how institutional logics may 
influence the perception and judgment of organizational actors. We do so in this paper. We 
hypothesize that specific texts, as environmental cues, can nonconsciously prime institutional 
logics making them accessible as frames of reference for the individual. Binding to Loersch 
and Payne (2011), we consider nonconscious activation in the context of priming to comprise 
situations where the individual is unaware that they are being primed, and/or unaware of the 
prime’s effect on their behavior (also, Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996). We further hypothesize 
that these institutional logics once primed, will bias the organizational actor’s subsequent 
perception and judgment when presented with an ambiguous situation that can be interpreted 
in different ways. 
Testing these linked hypotheses requires that we differentially prime the institutional 
logics of interest, and then check for their influence on organizational actor perception and 
judgment. Thus, in operationalizing the study, we follow other authors e.g., Goodrick and 
Reay, (2011), and assume that mental representations in the form of institutional logics exist, 
and that it is possible to use vocabularies that are descriptors of the different institutional logic 
constructs as primes. However, to ensure construct validity, we bind to vocabularies and 
abstractions already identified in previous literature (e.g., Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 
2012; Hyndman et al., 2014). This approach to identifying key vocabularies associated with 
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unique institutional logics and using them as descriptors for comparison has been previously 
used by, for example, Goodrick & Reay (2011). Nonetheless, as with previous authors (e.g., 
Goodrick & Reay, 2011), we acknowledge the imperfect nature of these descriptors given the 
lack a coherent identity among the institutional logics that they draw from. They however 
present us with a stable starting point for systematic empirical comparison (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011).  
In the following section, we describe the study methodology in greater detail.  
3.3 Design and methods 
We designed this study as a between subjects randomized post-test only experimental study in 
which different groups from the same population are differentially primed and compared. 
Following similar studies in psychology e.g., Vohs et al., (2006), the priming tool was 
formulated as a 30-item scrambled sentence test that was presented to the participants as a test 
of English language ability.  Each item on the ‘test’ contained a scrambled set of five words 
from which the participants were expected to construct a grammatically correct four-word 
sentence as quickly as possible. For example, ‘was, not, there, he, in’ could be rewritten as ‘he 
was not in’ or ‘he was not there’. Four versions of this test were developed, with three intended 
to each prime a unique institutional logic, and the fourth intended to prime none. For the test 
conditions, half the items contained an adjective or verb semantically related to the institutional 
logic in question. For example, for public administration logic the critical priming stimuli 
included: government, authority, compliance, administration and regulation. The rest of the 
items in the test conditions, as well as all the items in the control conditions, were ordinary-
use neutral words not intended to prime any condition but rather to disguise the test objectives. 
A list of the priming stimuli incorporated in the scrambled sentence tests for the test conditions 
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is provided in Appendix 1. These priming tools were tested and refined on a small pool of 
individuals with profiles like the intended study participants. 
The study participants comprised 98 public and private sector managers who were 
concurrently attending executive masters’ level courses at a private university in Nairobi, 
Kenya. Though common, the use of student participants in laboratory experiments has faced 
much criticism (Anderson & Stritch, 2016). In this study, we used the university as an access 
point, but these students had a professional profile - working their regular jobs by day and 
studying in the evenings, or in sandwich programs. Moreover, the study focus was on a general 
judgment issue which authors such as Druckman and Kam (2011) suggest are generalizable, 
and can be examined using student populations.  
Once enrolled into the study, the participants gave signed consent and completed a form 
designed to capture age, gender and work experience. Their participation in the study was 
voluntary. Of the 98 practitioners who participated in the study, 56 were enrolled in an MBA 
in Healthcare Management program while 42 were in a Master’s in Public Policy program. 
Regarding sex, 65 (66.3%) were female and 32 (32.7%) were male. The participants age range 
was 23-53 (mean 33.82, SD 8.865), while work experience in the private sector was a mean 
4.57 years (SD4.57) and in the public sector 3.91 years (SD 4.934). 
The participants were then randomly assigned to one of the three treatment conditions 
- public administration logic (PUB prime, n=25), market-managerial logic (MKT prime, 
n=24), and professional logic (PROF prime, n=24); or to a control group (CONTROL, n=25). 
In terms of distribution across the treatment and control groups there were no differences 
between the groups based on the master’s program attended (X²0.197, 3df, p0.978), based on 
age (F1.347, p0.264), years in private sector (F1.695, p0.174), or years in the public sector 
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(F0.441, p0.724). We however noted an imbalance regarding gender distribution between the 
groups (X²13.377, 3df, p0.004). This is not altogether unexpected given the two-thirds female 
majority. And given the samples are balanced in all other aspects, we do not consider this 
gender imbalance inimical to the internal validity of the experiment and the testing of the 
hypothesis. We nonetheless assess its effect on the study findings. 
Following random assignment, the first task - a scrambled sentence test masked as a 
test of English proficiency, was administered. Participants independently completed their own 
test, and neither experimenter nor participant knew in advance what group each participant 
would be assigned. Moreover, the room environment was controlled by making it as plain as 
possible to ensure that no extraneous environmental variables would attract the participants’ 
attention. This eliminated possible confounding by other text or visual variables in the 
environment while leaving the priming task as the only manipulated and distinguishing 
variable amongst the participants. 
Upon completion of the scrambled sentence task, participants completed a Positive 
Affect-Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) questionnaire that was originally designed to 
categorize feelings and emotions (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Following Vohs, Mead 
and Goode (2006), we applied this scale as a dissociative task to separate and make it difficult 
to link the first phase of the experiment (the priming manipulation), from the subsequent phase 
where the effect of the manipulation was to be tested. Additionally, given its original design, 
the PANAS questionnaire had a supplementary role in checking for potential mood changes 
after manipulation. In this regard, there were no unforeseen emotional consequences of the 
priming manipulation.  
Next, the participants were presented with an ambiguous scenario that read as follows: 
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‘X has just come from a national health stakeholders meeting. She begins to think of 
recommendations that she could give to the stakeholders group to improve the current 
health situation in the country. Which recommendation do you think would be most 
appropriate?’ 
We chose to present an ambiguous scenario for two reasons. First, much of the information 
transmitted between individuals in social contexts is ambiguous (Kahneman, 2012). Second, 
ambiguity provides opportunity for individuals to freely interpret the scenario based on their 
individual (in this case, manipulated) cognitive processes, thus allowing differences, if any, to 
emerge (Kahneman, 2012).  
Together with this scenario, the participants were presented with a list of ten 
recommendations and asked to rank them in order from their most to least preferred. This was 
the core of the experiment, aimed at checking the influence, if any, of the priming manipulation 
on the choices made by the study participants. Moreover, the ranking was presented as a forced 
rank, meaning that each recommendation had to be assigned a unique value ranging from one 
to ten. The recommendations themselves were structured in such a way that they were 
concordant with either a public administration logic, a market-managerial logic, or a 
professional logic.  
Prior to analyzing the data, the said recommendations were reorganized and 




Table 3.1 Recommendation categories and codes 
Recommendation Consolidated indicative logic Code 
Recommend to enhance compliance to the rules and 
regulations 
Recommendations aligned to 
public administration logic 
PUBLIC LOGIC 
Recommend to clarify hierarchy and flow of 
information upwards from the frontline health worker to 
the health facility managers all the way up 
Recommend to increase government oversight 
   
Recommend greater focus on results Recommendations aligned to 
market-managerial logic 
MARKET 
LOGIC Recommend to enhance competition in service 
provision 
Recommend focus on public as client/customer 
Recommend to improve management 
   
Recommend greater involvement of medical 
professionals in management 




Recommend greater autonomy for doctors and nurses 
Recommend greater participation of other stakeholders 
in health service provision 
 
 
The pattern of consolidation was drawn from an analysis of extant literature that involved the 
extraction of key words associated with each institutional logic (see also Appendix 3.1).  
Finally, the participants were asked to complete an evaluation questionnaire and 
debriefed to check on any overlooked factors in the environment or any suspicions about the 
intent of the experiment that could have influenced their recommendation choices. More 
specifically, we sought to determine whether the participants attached any theme to the phrases 
in the descrambling task or whether they connected the descrambling task to the subsequent 
tasks that they were given. The post-experiment evaluation questionnaires revealed that the 
few who reported that the descrambling task made them ‘think in a particular way’, gave vague 





Having consolidated the recommendations aligned to a public logic as “PUBLIC LOGIC”, to 
a market-managerial logic as “MARKET LOGIC”, and to a professional logic as 
“PROFESSIONAL LOGIC”, we applied the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis (KW) one-way 
ANOVA (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952; Corder & Foreman, 2009) to statistically check for 
experimental effects. The appropriateness of the KW arose from the fact that: (1) the dependent 
variable was ordinal, (2) the independent variable comprised three categorical and independent 
groups, and (3) the observations were independent with no relationships between observations 
in each group, and between groups.  
The results show a statistically significant difference between the experimental 
conditions regarding the choice of recommendations aligned to a public logic (X²(2df) =10.586, 
p=0.005), and a market-managerial logic (X²(2df) = 6.764, p=0.034). For the professional 
logic, the results were not statistically significant (X²(2df) =4.315, p=0.116). We cannot 
however dismiss the possibility of an effect regarding the professional prime group, 
considering that with small sample sizes, important effects can be non-significant, that is, can 
return a type II error (Cohen 1973, 1988; Prentice & Miller, 1992). Moreover, as the KW is an 
omnibus test for differences between k-independent samples, we cannot tell whether 
differences in any one pair combination are masked by differences in another. Consequently, 
we turn to post hoc comparisons between groups, and to estimates of the magnitude of the 
effect that is relatively independent of sample size. Table 3.2 below illustrates these post hoc 




Table 3.2. Posthoc ANOVA comparisons between treatment groupsª 
 Group 1 (PUB Prime) v 
Group 2 (MKT Prime) 
Group 1 (PUB Prime) v 
Group 3 (PROF Prime) 
Group 2 (MKT Prime) v 
Group 3 (PROF Prime) 
PUB MKT PUB PROF MKT PROF 
Chi-Square 8.973 6.722 6.008 4.115 .754 1.752 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig .003*** .010*** .014** .042** .385 n.s .186 n.s 
ES¹ʹ² .195 .146 .13 .089 .016 .037 
ªGrouping variable: Priming code 
**p<.05, ***p<0.01, n.s not significant 
¹Eta-Squared as a measure of effect size in ANOVA 
²ES 0.02 small, 0.13 medium, 0.26 large (Cohen, 1973, 1988) 
 
Examination of the results displayed in Table 3.2 reveal statistically significant differences at 
p<.05 between groups 1 (primed for public logic) and 2 (primed for market-managerial logic), 
and between groups 1 and 3 (primed for professional logic), in how they ranked 
recommendations aligned to the public and market-managerial, and the public and professional 
logics respectively. Conversely, the differences between groups 2 (primed market-managerial 
logic) and 3 (primed professional logic) in how they ranked recommendations aligned to the 
market-managerial and professional logics were not statistically significant. Nevertheless, 
calculation of the effect size reveal medium to large effects (Cohen 1973, 1988). This points 
to an important effect considering Kuhberger’s (1998) meta-analytic findings that suggest 
framing effects based on the well-accepted prospect theory, to be small to moderate in size.  
Our interest however, went beyond the difference within categories, to the pattern of 
choices displayed after the nonconscious priming. We considered these patterns apt 
illuminations of nonconsciously guided preferences. Thus, Figure 3.1 below illustrates the 
pattern of recommendations based on the mean values assigned to all the response category 
groups (PUBLIC LOGIC, MARKET LOGIC and PROFESSIONAL LOGIC) by each 
experimental group (Group PUBLIC, MARKET and PROFESSIONAL) in isolation, as well 
as the control. As the ranking by the study participants was done from one to ten, with one 
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being the most preferred and ten the least, for each of the response types, lower values imply 
greater preference. 




Analysis of the patterns based on the means of the values assigned by the participants 
reveal that participants in the public prime condition (Group PUBLIC) most preferred 
recommendations that were congruent with their primed logic i.e., recommendations relating 
to increased government oversight and adherence to laid down rules and regulations. They 
least preferred recommendations that were aligned to the market-managerial logic, ranking 
them much lower down the scale. On the other hand, participants in the market-managerial 
prime condition (Group MARKET) gave preference to recommendations congruent with a 
market-managerial logic. They assigned lower ranks to recommendations that were better 
aligned to the public administration (ranked third) and professional logics (ranked second). 
Finally, the analysis shows that participants in the professional prime condition (Group 
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PROFESSIONAL) most preferred recommendations that were congruent with professional 
logic. They least preferred recommendations that were aligned to the public administration 
logic.  
And so, for each of these experimental conditions, we find empirical evidence of 
judgment, regarding the ambiguous scenario presented, to be congruent to the primed logic. 
Moreover, we observe important differences between their ranking and that done by 
participants in the control condition. The control group seemingly had no preferences, with an 
almost even ranking for the three recommendation clusters allied to the public, market-
managerial and professional logics. 




Figure 3.2 above captures the means and confidence intervals by treatment group as well as 
the control. The figure clearly demonstrates clustering about a mean of 5 for the control group, 
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while the treatment groups generally had means 0.5-2 units above or below the control. The 
overlap of confidence intervals however implies that whereas the mean ranks between the 
treatment groups and the control were numerically different, this difference was not 
statistically significant for the professional prime group (X²(1df) = 2.117, p=0.146) and the 
public prime group (X²(1df) = 0.526, p=0. 468). It was however significant at p<.05 for the 
market prime group (X²(1df) = 6.128, p=0.013). 
 Finally, Table 3.3 below presents the results of the ANOVA done to rule out the 
possibility of influences or confounds by sex or by organizational experience. 
Table 3.3. ANOVA for gender and public/private sector experience 
 
Variable Test statistics PUB MKT PROF 
Genderª Chi-Square 3.707 .005 2.007 
df 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig .054(n.s) .942(n.s) .157(n.s) 
Organization experienceᵇ Chi-Square 3.384 1.968 3.109 
df 2 2 2 
Asymp. Sig .184(n.s) .374(n.s) .211(n.s) 
 ªGender (Female=1, Male=0) 
 ᵇOrganization experience (Public Only=1, Private Only=2, Both Public and Private=3) 
(n.s) not significant 
 
The results show no differences between gender, in terms of the pattern of their 
recommendations, at the 0.05 level for the public logic (X²(1df) = 3.707, p=0.054), the market 
logic (X²(1df) = 0.005, p=0.942) and the professional logic (X²(1df) = 2.007, p=0.157). The 
results also show no differences between the participants as grouped based on their 
organizational experience, in terms of the pattern of their recommendations, at the 0.05 level 
for the public logic (X²(2df) = 3.384, p=0.184), the market logic (X²(2df) = 1.968, p=0.374) 
and the professional logic (X²(2df) = 3.109, p=0.211). These results thus lend credence to the 
claim that the observed differences were likely due to the experimental manipulation – the 
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priming of the different institutional logics, and not due to differences in the sexes or in 
organizational experience.  
3.5 Discussion, implications for theory and practice, and future research  
Our findings provide empirical evidence for, and partially explain how institutional 
logics, as frames of reference, condition how individuals make sense of their environment and 
react to it (Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992, p.16; also, Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). 
Moreover, because the priming process was not apparent to the individual, and the link 
between the priming content and institutional logics subtly hidden, the study suggests 
nonconscious activation of these institutional logics by the text cues. The results obtained 
further suggest that once activated, the institutional logic, is then used to answer questions 
afforded by subsequent scenarios facing the participant.  
To illustrate, if an individual is primed for public administration, when faced with an 
ambiguous set of circumstances to which he must make a recommendation, his perception and 
interpretation of the situation, and consequent judgment on the questions afforded by it, will 
be inadvertently colored by the primed public administration logic. This non-conscious 
influence of institutional logics on his default perception and judgment, may thus partially 
explains the routine re-enactment, and accordingly the constraining effect, persistence and 
stability of institutional logics. The fact that this was a controlled experiment with random 
assignment supports this causal claim. 
Furthermore, in this experiment, we used a simple form of priming – text, which is one 
of the numerous cues in everyday environments. And we obtained significant measurable 
impacts on perception and judgment. Our findings thus lend support to Barr, Stimpert and 
Huff’s (1992) assertions that environmental stimuli can prompt changes in cognitive models. 
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Additionally, they bring to the fore the role of text, material objects, artefacts and their 
representations, as potential priming stimuli for institutional logics – an important yet under-
examined issue (Lawrence, Leca & Zilber, 2013).  
 
3.5.1 Theoretical implications 
These findings have important theoretical implications. If weak, nonconscious cues 
such as the text we used in this experiment can strongly influence perception and judgment, 
then it is plausible that the initial stance taken by individuals on issues that confront them, is 
an indirect result of subtle, and possibly not so subtle, cues from the environment. Our findings 
thus draw attention to the importance of text, vocabularies and language in triggering 
institutional logics. Indeed, they support Weick’s (1995) claim that words ‘approximate the 
territory’, and may be used, by individual actors to ‘convert ongoing cues into meaning’ (also, 
Powell & Colyvas, 2008). 
Do these findings then mean that organizational actors are ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel, 
1967) routinely re-enacting institutionalized scripts? We think not. Rather, we align to Seo and 
Creed (2002), Kahneman (2012) and others, who point to the possibility of both active and 
passive influences on organizational actor judgment and consequent action. In this conception, 
actors ‘may participate in an automatic, unreflective way, and in other periods they may 
become very purposeful in trying to reach beyond the limits of their present situation in 
accordance with alternative conceptions of its purposes, structures, technologies, and other 
features’ (Seo & Creed, 2002 quoting Benson 1977, p.7).  
This conceptualization of a non-conscious cognitive process operating alongside a 
conscious cognitive one has been observed in social and cognitive psychology (e.g., Bargh, 
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2006; Kahneman, 2012), but it has yet to be fully and more empirically examined in the 
management literature. We however consider this two-pronged conscious and nonconscious 
influence of institutional logics an apt model for explaining the theoretical paradox on how 
actors’ perceptions and judgment are conditioned by the very institutions that they consciously 
engage with and at times, seek to change (also, Seo & Creed, 2002).  
  
3.5.2 Practical implications 
The findings in this study suggest that underlying attitudes and motivations that draw 
from one’s referent logics probably have a greater influence on perception and judgment than 
previously envisaged. Moreover, the environment – in this case, text – has the potential of 
nonconsciously surfacing unique logics through priming effects. Furthermore, though the 
experiment did not test the tenacity of the hold that these institutional logics have on 
organizational actor perception, the demonstration of their nonconscious influence is an 
indicator of their taken-for-grantedness, and accordingly, their influence on the actors’ 
position. It is plausible that these cues may be strong enough to override explicit instructions 
given to the actor, thus creating disharmony and increasing the likelihood for inefficiencies in 
organizational action. Practitioners may therefore want to consider how they frame and 
communicate issues of strategic import, if the organization is to secure broad-based support 
towards their implementation. 
 
3.5.3 Limitations of the study 
Despite the interesting results presented here, we aver that they be viewed with caution 
given the study’s limitations. The findings are based on a moderately-sized sample and as such 
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are subject to all the limitations of such sample sizes. Akin to other authors (e.g., Prentice & 
Miller, 1992) we however opine that small samples can be sufficient to detect large effects. It 
is in the detection of small effects that large samples are a necessity (Matthews, 2011). Second, 
the study participants, as a convenience sample, may have a unique profile that could limit the 
applicability of the results to other settings. They were concurrently practitioners and students 
– working full time during the day, and attending studies in the evenings or at modular intervals 
during the year. And so, despite recent positive statements regarding the external 
generalizability of experiments done with students (e.g., Druckman & Kam, 2011; Ganegoda 
& Folger, 2015), we advise caution when inferring these results to the broader population. 
Finally, this study, in the absence of any precursors, was exploratory. Its intention was 
to seek empirically-backed clues as to whether and how institutional logics could influence 
perception and judgment, and further to test the utility and applicability of the experimental 
design used for such micro-level studies. And so, whereas it cannot make any firm claims of 
causality, the study findings nevertheless suggest that institutional logics play a role in 
organizational actor perception and judgment, that they can be primed by inconsequential cues 
such as text, and that their influence can at times be nonconscious. With these findings, this 
study thus opens the possibility for further exploration using similar or more refined 
experimental designs or other appropriate methods, and with larger samples. 
  
3.5.4 Future research 
The complexities and limitations described above bring to the fore, several issues that 
must be considered by future research. For example, what is the nature of interaction between 
the nonconscious influence of institutional logics and conscious cognitive processes? 
 95 
 
Likewise, whereas the relatively simple approach used led to significant results, the possibility 
of a host of moderators or mediators of the nonconscious activation of institutional logics 
exists. Future research could explore these moderation and mediation effects including the 
following questions: What is the effect of the degree of abstractness of the constructs? Does 
temporal distance between the priming effect and the consideration of the issue of concern 
have any effect? And how do enduring motives, and individual and organizational goals 
interact with the process of nonconscious activation of these institutional logics? Does 
organizational context matter?  
Moreover, we also need to examine the role played by conscious processes in 
interaction with nonconscious processes, and how both these processes interact in the real 
world where organizational action often relies on collaboration with others (Loersch & Payne, 
2011). This is even more important in complex institutional settings such as the public sector, 
inhabited by actors with varied experiences and expertise, and whose perspectives must be 
considered for any collaborative activity to be possible (Loersch & Payne, 2011; 
Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). For example, in such stimulus rich environments, if conflicting 
perspectives are activated, which one wins? Why? Finally, as may have been alluded to in this 
study, and in line with the work of other scholars (e.g., Ocasio, Loewenstein & Nigam, 2015), 
an analysis of the use of language - words, sentences and speech - in getting things done at the 
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3.7 Appendices to Chapter Three 
Appendix 3.1 Institutional Logic Definition 
Logic Public Logic  
(PUB Prime) 
Market-Managerial 
Logic (MKT Prime) 




organization based on 
administrative rationality 
(Hayes et al., 2014); highly 
centralized bureaucracy 
based on laws, rules and 
directives (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011; Meyer et 
al., 2014); strict 
accountability to the state 
(Meyer et al., 2014); services 
provided directly and 





(Gruening, 2001); focus 
on economic/cost 
control, efficiency and 
effectiveness (Coule & 
Patmore, 2013); focus on 
achieving results (Meyer 
et al., 2014); internal and 
external competition for 
service provision (Hayes 
et al., 2014) 
embodies guild power 
and status differences - 
these select and reject 
members, regulate 
through codes and 
through supervision 
(Noordegraaf, 2007; 
Goodrick & Reay, 2011; 
Hyndman et al., 2014); 
premium on professional 
qualifications and 
abstract knowledge 




command and bureaucratic 
control (Rhodes, 2007; 
Olsen, 2009; Hayes et al., 
2014; Hyndman et al., 
2014); logic of 




(Gruening, 2001; Hayes 
et al., 2014; Hyndman et 
al., 2014); market 
parameters utilized to 
allocate scarce resources 
and achieve desired 
economies and 
efficiencies (Coule & 
Patmore, 2013) 
Autonomy cherished 
(Goodrick and Reay, 
2011); quality of services 
assessed through strong 
reliance on professional 
opinion (Reay & 
Hinings, 2005); code of 
conduct, code of ethics, 
institutionalized 
disciplinary control 
through the professional 
associations 
(Noordegraaf, 2007) 
Key words Authority, Government, 
Compliance, Hierarchy, 
Order/Orderly, Rules, 
Public, Procedure, Guide, 
Administration, 
Bureaucracy, Regulations, 




























CHAPTER 4  
ASSESSING PERFORMANCE-USE PREFERENCES THROUGH AN 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS LENS 
 
This chapter also addresses the second research objective but with a specific focus on 
empirically investigating how nstitutional logics, once primed, relate to the use of performance 
measurement systems in the public sector. 
The chapter has been submitted as a scientific paper and has been accepted for publication in 





The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of shared cognitive frames, in particular, 
that of institutional logics, on the deployment and use of performance measurement systems 
in the public sector. Using novel priming techniques derived from behavioral and social 
psychology, three institutional logics – the public, market-managerial and professional logics, 
are differentially surfaced in three independent experimental groups. The influence of these 
primed institutional logics on performance measurement use preferences are then empirically 
assessed using appropriate ANOVA techniques. We find that, contrary to theoretical 
predictions, there is evidence of logic congruence regarding some uses of performance 
measurement systems in the public sector, and divergence regarding others. Individuals 
applying a public logic are more likely to propose performance measurement use for strategic 
planning or strategic alignment; while those applying a professional logic are more likely to 






Performance is a notion that has preoccupied public administration scholars for decades 
(Amirkhanyan et al., 2013). It is considered essential that public sector organizations perform, 
and further that they measure and communicate this performance to key stakeholders (Henman, 
2016). Performance measurement, that is, the ‘enumeration of organizational or system level 
processes, outputs and outcomes’ (Henman, 2016), in the public sector, is however not easy 
given the need to address multiple dimensions and to satisfy multiple constituents 
(Amirkhanyan et al., 2013). 
This idea of performance measurement serving many purposes is not new (e.g., 
Atkinson et al., 1997). Nonetheless, its study has been largely overlooked in empirical research 
that has instead focused on performance measurement system (PMS) design and 
implementation (Henri, 2006; also, Fryer, Antony & Ogden, 2009; Moynihan & Pandey, 
2010), and on whether, why and how information generated by the PMS is used (e.g., de lancer 
Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Moynihan & Ingraham, 2004; Moynihan & Pandey, 2010; 
Hammerschmid, van de Walle & Stimac, 2013; Kroll, 2015). Furthermore, the sparse extant 
research on PMS use has predominantly focused on enumerating the different uses (e.g. Behn, 
2003; Franco-Santos et al., 2007) and on identifying the outcomes and consequences of such 
use (e.g. Spekle & Verbeeten, 2014), but not on the factors that influence PMS use. And so, 
beyond the few studies as exemplified by Henri (2006) on the relationship between 
organizational culture and the nature of PMS use, there is a paucity of empirical literature on 
whether and how similarly shared perspectives or cognitive frames influence PMS use in 
public sector organizations.  
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Accordingly, our specific interest is on institutional logics - the shared, socially-
constructed decision-making frames (Friedland & Alford, 1991), that ‘influence opinions by 
stressing specific values, facts and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent 
relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame’ (Nelson et 
al., 1997, p.569). Though other authors have examined the influence of institutional logics on 
the operationalization of PMS (e.g., Carvalho et al, 2006; Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; 
Rautiainen et al., 2017), much extant work is conceptual rather than empirical, is focused on 
design, consequences and outcomes and not use, and is located at the meso-organizational level 
of analysis and not the micro-level (Micheli & Mari, 2014; Henman, 2016). Yet, organizations 
are inhabited by individuals of varying backgrounds and affiliations, who are tasked with 
implementing these PMS. And they may draw from different institutional logics with 
potentially different emphases on PMS use, in their sense-making (Rautiainen et al., 2017).  
The aim of this paper is therefore to analyze the link between institutional logics and 
the deployment and use of PMS in the public sector. We hypothesize that each institutional 
logic will make a specific set of issues about PMS use more salient, in comparison to those 
identified by a different logic. Accordingly, individuals primed for an institutional logic will 
be differentially biased regarding whether and why PMS should be introduced in the public 
sector. 
This paper thus contributes to public sector performance measurement literature by 
elaborating and nuancing the relationships between institutional logics and PMS use. In this 
regard, we extend the work of Carvalho et al, (2006), and Rautiainen and colleagues (2017), 
by examining an expanded set of reasons for PMS use, and by assessing the possibility of 
institutional logics as drivers for these uses. Thus, for researchers, the study underscores the 
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importance of institutional logics as a lens through which public sector performance 
measurement can be analyzed. The study also introduces novel experimental methodology that 
can be exploited by researchers to better understand cognitive influences and inter-personal 
interactions at the micro-level. For practitioners, the study foregrounds the question of whether 
and how to craft messaging to garner the support of organizational stakeholders towards the 
operationalization of PMS in the public sector.  
In the next section, we present a brief synopsis of the literature on PMS use and on 
institutional logics, and further develop our hypothesis. We then describe the experimental 
methodology used, present the study findings, and discuss the results and their possible 
interpretation. 
4.2 Performance measurement use in the public sector 
PMS serve different purposes for organizations. For example, Atkinson et al. (1997) classify 
the roles of performance measurement systems as coordination, monitoring, and diagnosis. 
Building on this earlier work, Henri (2006) identifies four types of PMS use: monitoring, 
attention-focusing, strategic decision-making and legitimization. Also, Franco-Santos et al. 
(2007) identify and sort 17 different roles played by PMS in organizations into five broad 
categories: measurement of performance, strategy management, communication, behavior-
influencing, and learning and improvement. Conversely, regarding public management, Behn 
(2003) assumes a practice perspective to identify eight managerial purposes for measuring 
performance. These are, to evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, and to 
improve.  
In this paper, we draw on the work of these authors to derive an appropriate list of PMS 
uses as presented in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1. PMS uses  
Atkinson et al., 1997 Hansen & van 
der Stede, 2004 





captions and choice 
selections 
Coordination: focus on 








should we consider? Cues – 
key success factors, indicate 
primary and secondary 
objectives 
Strategic decision making: 
reveals cause and effect 






attention, provide alignment 
Exploratory use (A): 
priority setting, 
policy development 
Prognostic (specifying what 
needs to be done, alignment 
and control) 
A-improve productivity & 
mission effectiveness 
B-align strategic activities 
to strategic plans 
Diagnostic: assessment of 
cause and effect 
relationships, process 
performance, organization 




Monitoring (A): how am I 
doing? Output measured, 
goals & output compared, 




rewarding or compensation 
behavior, managing 
relationships, control 




problems and attributing 
blame) 
C-provide rational basis for 
selecting what process 
improvement to make first 
D-help identify best practice 
Monitoring: measuring and 





Monitoring (B): information 
gathered for internal and 
external disclosure 
Measure performance: 




benchmarking, internal and 
external communication 
 




Operational use (B): 
communication 
Motivational (call to arms 
for engaging in ameliorating 
situation or taking 
corrective action, 
communication) 
E-support better judgment 
and decisions 
F-enhance competition 
among service providers) 
- - Legitimization (?): assertion 
of self-interest and exercise of 
power 
Legitimization (B): establish 
authority and maintain 
credibility 
Communication (B): 
Compliance with regulation 
 Legitimation & Regulation 
(credibility with internal and 
external audiences, 
compliance) 
I-the law requires it 
J-is an industry norm 
- - Legitimization (A): 
rationalization (retrospective 
understanding of an action), 
justification and validation of 
current and future actions 




Exploratory use (B): 
double-loop learning 
Learning & Improvement 
G-help in benchmarking 
H-help learning in order to 




As may be evident from Figure 4.1, the main difference between the assorted lists is the 
boundaries between the categories, the number of PMS roles identified and the labels applied 
to different roles or categories (also, Spekle & Verbeeten, 2014). Thus, our derived list, 
mapped against the works of these authors, presents PMS as serving prognostic, diagnostic, 
motivational, legitimating and learning and improvement roles. Prognostic use implies the 
specification of what needs to be done to better align strategic activities, and improve 
productivity and mission effectiveness. Conversely, diagnosis entails identifying problems and 
attributing blame. Thus, diagnostic PMS uses include helping identify best practice and 
providing a rational basis for selecting what process improvement to make first. Motivational 
uses inhere score keeping to enhance competition among service providers and to support 
better judgment and decision-making. Additionally, PMS use for legitimation inheres 
compliance, that is, conformity with the law; as well as implementation as an industry norm. 
Finally, PMS for learning and improvement encompasses both benchmarking and learning to 
implement better in the future. 
Following Behn (2003), this list is practice rather than theory-defined. By practice-
defined we suggest that the list captures the language of practitioners, while drawing from the 
work of earlier authors. The disadvantage of such an orientation, and hence the advantage of 
theory-defined variables is that the latter are more likely to have more precise meanings (Luft 
& Shields, 2003; Hansen & van der Stede, 2004). Our literature review however suggests the 
nonexistence of such precise meanings for PMS use. Previous authors have used different 
terms, either drawn from the work of earlier authors, or in some instances, developed ab initio 
to capture the essence of their research interest (Hansen & van der Stede, 2004). Our list, in 
similar tradition, draws from this earlier work but with a clear caveat that the framing of the 
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list of uses may be possibly ambiguous, particularly as each use embodies complex 
organizational phenomena that are generally difficult to measure. 
4.3 Institutional logics as frames of reference 
Goffman (1974), taking a macro-sociological approach, posited that individuals make sense of 
the world through socially-derived interpretive schemes that he referred to as ‘primary 
frameworks’. Drawing similar conclusions from individual-level studies, the psychology 
literature identifies and describes an individual’s frame of reference as ‘a built-up repertoire of 
tacit knowledge that is used to impose structure upon, and impart meaning to, otherwise 
ambiguous social and situational information to facilitate understanding’ (Gioia, 1986, p.56).  
However, whereas individuals may have unique frames of reference, they also tend to 
share core beliefs with others (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). These common elements derive 
from social interaction (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), discussion or negotiation (Isabella, 1990), 
and from training (Tolbert, 1988). It is these shared cognitive elements that individuals draw 
on to construct and reconstruct their social reality (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). And it is these 
shared elements that are recognizable at the macro-level, as institutional logics (Orlikowski & 
Gash, 1994). Thornton et al., (2012) explicitly make this connection, presenting institutional 
logics as ‘frames of reference that condition actor’s choices for sense-making’ (p.3). Thus, 
conceptualizing institutional logics as shared frames of reference presents an apt mechanism 
that connects institutional logics at the individual, group and societal levels of abstraction 
without loss in meaning.   
And so, as institutional logics shape and define what concerns are legitimate, which 
issues deserve attention, and what solutions and answers are appropriate (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008), we anticipate different institutional logics to uniquely shape and constrain actor 
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assumptions, expectations and choices regarding PMS and their uses. Put succinctly, our 
hypothesis is that influenced by different institutional logics, organizational actors will rank a 
set of PMS uses such that the highest rank (or greatest preference) will be given to those uses 
that best align to the institutional logic they are drawing from as a frame of reference. 
To operationalize this study, we focus on three institutional logics - the logic of the 
professions, the logic of public administration, and the market-managerial logic. These three 
logics are ubiquitous in the public sector, and have been previously defined in the literature 
(e.g., Thornton et al., 2012). Specifically, the logic of the professions places emphasis on the 
professional’s specific knowledge, expertise and experience (Thornton et al., 2012), and 
autonomy (Reay & Hinings, 2005). Thus, service rendered is regulated by professional bodies 
(Noordegraaf, 2007) and its quality is subject to peer opinion (Reay & Hinings, 2005), rather 
than the dictates of the professional’s employer (Noordegraaf, 2007).  
Conversely, the logic of public administration is anchored on rules, procedure, and 
strict accountability to the state (Meyer et al., 2014). Hierarchy is key, as is oversight (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2011). Thus, the public administration logic is characterized by top-down 
bureaucracy (Coule & Patmore, 2013). Moreover, compared to the market-management logic, 
competitiveness, performance and results are generally considered subordinate to adherence to 
routines, rules and procedures (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Hyndman et al., 2014). Contrariwise, 
competition, competitiveness, and results-based performance underpinned by efficiency and 
effectiveness are hallmarks of the market-management logic (Hyndman et al., 2014; Meyer et 
al., 2014). Thus, the primary focus of this logic is targets and results. And managerial discretion 
in moving resources to better achieve desired results is acknowledged and supported (Meyer 
et al., 2014). 
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This description of the three institutional logics of interest is however inexhaustive. 
And whereas we provide an illustrative table in Appendix 1, more substantive discussions can 
be obtained from, for example, Saz-Carranza and Longo (2012), and Hyndman et al., (2014). 
4.4 Method and Data 
In this experimental design study, participants (n=98) were randomly assigned to treatment or 
control groups, differentially primed, and asked to do an evaluative task. The central feature 
of the experiment was a forced ranking exercise, with the dependent variable being ranks 
assigned to each of a set of ten reasons for recommending PMS use in the public sector. 
 
4.4.1 Experimental treatments 
The experimental treatment was based on priming, a method that is ubiquitous in psychology. 
Priming generally involves the presentation of text or images related to a specific concept 
(Bargh, 2006; Loersch & Payne, 2011). Subsequent cognitive processing of the presented 
material ensures that pre-existing mental content that is semantically, experientially, 
evaluatively or otherwise conceptually related, including cognitive frames such as institutional 
logics, is activated and made accessible for current or latter use (Loersch & Payne, 2011). 
Consequently, subsequent questions afforded by the individual’s environment - whether these 
questions relate to interpretation, judgment or action, are answered within the framework of 
the activated and accessible mental content (Loersch & Payne, 2011).  
And so, to prime these three logics of interest, we follow similar studies in social and 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Vohs et al., 2006) and develop a 30-item scrambled sentence test 
as a priming tool. Each item on the tool comprised a scrambled set of five words from which 
the study subjects constructed a grammatically correct four-word sentence. For example, the 
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set ‘professionals, work, own, control, their’ could be rewritten as ‘professionals own their 
work’ or ‘professionals control their work’. We developed four versions of this tool – one each 
to prime the three logics of interest, and the fourth to prime none, hence acting as a control. 
For the tools intended to prime the three logics of interest, 15 of the items contained an 
adjective or verb semantically related to the institutional logic of interest, as priming stimuli. 
A complete list of the priming stimuli incorporated in the scrambled sentence tests for the test 
conditions is presented in Appendix 4.1. These key words, drawn from the analyses of previous 
authors (e.g., Thornton et al., 2012), capture the essence of the institutional logics of 
managerialism-market, the professions and the state. Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006) posit 
that institutional logics ‘contain framing elements…signature cues that identify the frame of 
reference used’ (p.1005). These signature cues or keywords ‘define [the] field and act as a 
radiating force around which associated terms or words cohere…directing attention and uniting 
a cluster of words into an image’ (Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008, p.1076). The other 15 items 
in the test conditions, as well as all 30 items in the control conditions, were ordinary-use neutral 
words purposefully used to mask the intent of the test. 
  
4.4.2 Participants 
The subject pool for this study comprised 98 masters-level students from a private university 
in Nairobi, Kenya. Despite its commonality, the use of students in research has come under 
increasing criticism for their lack of representativeness (Anderson & Stritch, 2016). 
Accordingly, though the differences between student and non-student subject pools are 
sometimes trivial (Anderson & Stritch, 2016), we recruited master’s students who were 
concurrently working and thus attending evening or sandwich programs, to increase the 
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external validity of possible findings. The students were recruited by an open call in class 
supplemented by an email channeled through their course administrators, under the guise of 
helping researchers collect views on government performance. In line with good ethical 
research practice, this deception was approved by the university institutional review board. 
Moreover, the study subjects were given opportunities to opt out at the time of recruitment and 
again prior to the commencement of the study.  
The mean age of the study subjects was 33.82 years (range, 23-53). Fifty-six subjects 
(approximately 57%) were enrolled in an MBA in Healthcare Management (MBA) program 
while the rest were enrolled in a Master’s in Public Policy (MPPM) program. Sixty-five 
(66.3%) of the study subjects were female. Regarding work experience, 34.7% reported private 
sector only experience while 21.4% reported public sector only experience. The remainder 
(37.8 %) had mixed sector experience. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the effects of 
randomization on the study subjects demographic traits across the treatment and control 
groups. 
Table 4.1 shows that the samples are balanced with respect to age, type of program, 
and years in the private or public sector, as determined through analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
for each trait. The table however shows an imbalance, across samples, for gender. This is not 
completely unexpected considering the majority female subject pool. We nevertheless take this 




Table 4.1. Subject demographic characteristics across treatment and control groups 






























































































4.4.3 The experimental task 
The study was conducted in four sittings at the university over a one week period. The study 
subjects scheduled appointment times to suit their availability. Consequently, all the 
experiments were carried out after completion of the day’s classes. 
Following their random allocation to either treatment or control groups, the study 
subjects were presented with the appropriate priming tools masked as a test of English 
language ability. The participants were all seated in a large, plain, all-white theatre-type class 
room with an examination style set up. No institutional or personal effects could be within 
view, and there was a minimum five-foot distance between the study subjects in all directions. 
To further reduce contamination, all instructions relevant to the tasks they were to do were 
provided on the sheets of paper that were handed out to them, and no between subjects or 
researcher-subject interaction was allowed. Thus, each participant worked independently to 
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construct grammatically correct four-word sentences from each of the 30 scrambled five-word 
sets.  
After this priming episode, the participants were presented with, and asked to complete, 
Watson, Clark and Tellegen’s (1988) Positive Affect-Negative Affect Scale Questionnaire. 
Consistent with other authors (e.g., Vohs et al., 2006), we applied this simple scale to not only 
check for mood changes post-manipulation, but as a dissociative task, aimed at making it 
difficult for the subjects to link the priming manipulation to the subsequent ranking exercise. 
As anticipated, there were no negative affect changes arising from the conduct of the priming 
episode. 
 
4.4.4 Ranking the reasons for PMS use in the public sector 
In this final step, the participants were presented with a ‘vote’ comprising two questions and a 
list of 10 reasons for PMS use in the public sector. The first question sought to know whether 
they would support the strengthening of performance measurement in the public sector. This 
was a binary yes or no question. The second question sought to know their reasons for 
supporting the strengthening of performance measurement in the public sector, assuming they 
had answered the first question in the affirmative. Participants were asked to respond to this 
second question by ranking their reasons in a hierarchical order from their most to least 
preferred options. A forced ranking method was applied, hence each option had to be given a 
unique value, ranging from one to ten.  
4.5 Results 
To statistically check for the effect of the primed institutional logic on preferences for PMS 
use, we applied a non-parametric ANOVA (Kruskal-Wallis). The results displayed in Table 
120 
 
4.2 show statistically significant differences in the ranks given to PMS use for aligning 
strategic activities to strategic plans (X²4.457, p=0.088) and for learning (X²8.795, p=0.012). 
There are however no significant differences in the ranks assigned to PMS use for all other 
uses. 
Table 4.2. One-way ANOVA (KW) for difference in preferences across all treatment groups 
Variable (Preferred use of PMS) X² Statistic Asymp. Sig. ES ( ) 
A-improve productivity & mission effectiveness 0.148 0.929 0.002 
B-align strategic activities to strategic plans 4.857 0.088* 0.070 
C-provide rational basis for selecting what process improvement to 
make first 
2.298 0.317 0.033 
D-help identify best practice 2.820 0.244 0.04 
E-support better judgment and decisions 0.917 0.665 0.013 
F-enhance competition among service providers 0.669 0.716 0.01 
G-help in benchmarking 0.715 0.699 0.01 
H-help learning in order to implement better in the future 8.795 0.012** 0.127 
I-the law requires it 0.559 0.756 0.008 
J-is an industry norm 2.381 0.304 0.035 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.005 
ES (eta Squared) 0.02 small, 0.13 medium, 0.26 large (Cohen, 1973, 1988) 
 
Nonetheless, we cannot dismiss the potential for a significant effect and so to supplement our 
inferential statistics and in line with good practice and the APA guidelines (Wilkinson and 
APA Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999), we turn to estimations of effect sizes that are 
relatively independent of the sample size (Cohen, 1973). The results, also displayed in Table 
4.2, show small effects (Cohen, 1973, 1988). 
To assess possible between-group differences hidden in the summative ANOVA test, 
we conduct post-hoc between-group comparisons. The results provided in Table 4.3 show that 
between the public-prime and market-managerial-prime groups, there is a statistically 
significant difference in the rank for PMS use for aligning strategic activities to strategic plans 
(X²4.802, p=0.028). For all the other uses the differences in rankings are not statistically 
significant, and the effect sizes are generally small. Additionally, between the public-prime 
and professional-prime groups, we observe, in Table 4.3, a statistically significant difference 
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in the rank for PMS use for learning purposes (X²8.563, p=0.003). There are no significant 
differences for all other uses. Finally, in the comparison between the market-managerial-prime 
group and the professional-prime group, we observe no significant differences in their ranking 
of the entire list of PMS uses. Moreover, the effect sizes are generally small (Cohen, 1973, 
1988). 
To further examine the effects of institutional logics on PMS use preferences, we 
assessed differences between the treatment and the control groups. The results displayed in 
Table 4.3 show statistically significant differences between the public-prime group versus the 
control in the rank assigned to PMS use in learning (X²6.051, p=0.014). It also shows a 
statistically significant difference between the market-managerial-prime group versus the 
control in the rank assigned to PMS use in aligning strategic activities to strategic plans 
(X²4.464, p=0.035). There were however no statistically significant differences in the rankings 
for all other uses between the public or market-managerial prime groups and the control, and 
neither was there any statistically significant difference in the rankings for any of the PMS uses 
between the professional prime group and the control group. Moreover, the effect sizes suggest 
a nil to small effect. 
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Table 4.3. One way ANOVA for Treatment and Control groups 
Variable Public Prime vs 
Mkt 
Public Prime vs Prof Mkt Prime vs 
Prof 
Public Prime vs 
Control 
Market Prime vs 
Control 
Prof Prime vs 
Control 





0.130 0.719 0.003 0.069 0.793 0.002 0.024 0.876 0.001 0.019 0.889 0.000 0.142 0.706 0.003 0.016 0.898 0.000 
B-align activities 
to plans 
4.802 0.028** 0.104 0.171 0.679 0.004 2.233 0.135 0.049 0.000 0.992 0.000 4.464 0.035** 0.093 0.106 0.744 0.002 
C- rational basis 
for process 
improvements 
0.051 0.821 0.001 2.087 0.149 0.046 1.311 0.252 0.029 1.124 0.289 0.024 0.548 0.459 0.011 0.404 0.525 0.009 
D-help identify 
best practice 
0.595 0.441 0.012 2.504 0.114 0.056 1.152 0.283 0.025 0.458 0.499 0.01 0.041 0.840 0.001 2.541 0.111 0.054 
E-support better 
judgment  
0.331 0.565 0.007 0.820 0.365 0.018 0.079 0.779 0.002 0.019 0.891 0.000 0.382 0.537 0.008 0.790 0.374 0.016 
F-enhance 
competition  
0.583 0.445 0.013 0.012 0.912 0.000 0.416 0.519 0.009 0.073 0.788 0.002 0.241 0.623 0.005 0.009 0.923 0.000 
G-help 
benchmarking 
0.754 0.385 0.016 0.018 0.893 0.000 0.302 0.582 0.007 0.399 0.528 0.008 0.060 0.807 0.001 0.202 0.653 0.004 
H-help learning  2.413 0.120 0.052 8.563 0.003*** 0.19 2.313 0.128 0.05 6.051 0.014** 0.129 0.118 0.731 0.002 1.864 0.172 0.04 
I-the law requires 
it 
0.590 0.442 0.012 0.117 0.732 0.003 0.128 0.721 0.003 0.112 0.738 0.002 0.080 0.777 0.002 0.007 0.931 0.000 
J-is an industry 
norm 
0.135 0.714 0.003 2.040 0.153 0.045 1.361 0.243 0.03 0.535 0.464 0.011 0.070 0.791 0.001 0.767 0.381 0.016 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.005 
Effect Size ( , eta Squared) 0.02 small, 0.13 medium, 0.26 large (Cohen, 1973, 1988) 
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To determine the direction of effect while remaining cognizant of the sample size, we 
created dummy variables by coding each preferred use as being in the ‘top three’ or not. We 
then compared these dummy variables (DV) across the treatment conditions. The results 
displayed in Figure 4.2 below thus depict the total number of times a particular use appeared 
in the ‘top three’ for each priming condition.  
 
Figure 4.2 Analysis of preferences (using dummy variables) by priming code 
 
 
We observe that the rank orders, based on these DV, differ for certain uses, while 
remaining similar for others. Thus, for example, those primed for public logic give most 
preference to the DV-B (align strategic activities to strategic plans) while those primed for 
market-managerial or professional logics relegate this dummy to second and third ranks 












(improve productivity & mission effectiveness) while those primed for market-managerial or 
professional logics give most preference to DV-C (provide rational basis for selecting what 
process improvement to make first). All three treatment conditions show least preference for 
DV-J (is an industry norm). But in addition, the public-prime condition has an equally low 
preference for G (help in benchmarking) as with J; while the professional-prime condition has 
an equally low preference for I (the law requires it) as with J (is an industry norm). 
In checking for any possible effects of the demographic traits we find no correlation 
between age and years of experience in the public or private sector, with rankings assigned to 
different PMS uses. The results, summarized in Table 4.4 below, show no statistically 
significant differences in the ranks assigned to any of the PMS uses, based on gender. However, 
between study subjects with public-sector-only and private-sector-only experience, there was 
a statistically significant difference at p0.003 and p0.048 respectively, in the rank assigned to 
PMS use to enhance competition. Further analysis of this difference reveals that public-sector-
only participants ranked PMS use for the enhancement of competition lower than those with 
private-sector-only or mixed-sector experience, while private-sector-only participants ranked 
the same item higher. Table 4.4 also reveals that study subjects enrolled in the MBA course 
ranked PMS use for the alignment of activities to strategic plans, higher than those enrolled in 
the MPPM course. The MBA study subjects however ranked PMS use for enhancing 
competition, to help in benchmarking, to help in learning and because the law requires it, lower 
than those enrolled in the MPPM course.
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Table 4.4. ANOVA for control variables 
Variable Gender (F=1) Pub Sector Exp. 
Only 
Private Sector Exp. 
Only 
Both Pub-Pvt. Sector 
Exp.  
Course - MBA 
F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. F Sig. 
A-improve productivity, 
mission effectiveness 
0.197 0.659 0.162 0.688 0.636 0.427 0.223 0.638 0.712 0.401 
B-align activities to plans 1.056 0.307 0.612 0.436 1.891 0.172 4.433 0.038** 3.475 0.065* 
C- rational basis for process 
improvements 
1.318 0.254 0.189 0.665 1.605 0.208 0.755 0.387 0.881 0.350 
D-help identify best practice 0.647 0.423 0.044 0.834 0.085 0.772 0.351 0.555 0.000 0.993 
E-support better judgment  0.699 0.405 0.663 0.418 1.834 0.179 2.898 0.092* 0.246 0.621 
F-enhance competition  0.449 0.505 9.131 0.003*** 4.007 0.048** 0.186 0.667 10.069 0.002*** 
G-help benchmarking 0.199 0.657 1.044 0.310 0.001 0.978 1.042 0.310 4.424 0.038** 
H-help learning  0.869 0.354 0.097 0.756 1.064 0.305 3.024 0.085* 3.514 0.064* 
I-the law requires it 0.001 0.976 0.002 0.963 0.020 0.886 0.060 0.807 4.134 0.045** 
J-is an industry norm 1.020 0.315 0.018 0.894 0.113 0.737 0.000 0.996 2.218 0.140 






The literature suggests that different institutional logics represent different world views that 
condition how actors interpret their realities, make judgments and act upon them (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008). Thus, one would expect the primed institutional logics to exert differential 
influence on the study subjects such that distinctively different patterns of preferences 
regarding PMS use would emerge. Accordingly, one would have expected study subjects 
primed for the public institutional logic to rank PMS uses for the alignment of strategic 
activities to strategic plans, and because the law requires it, much higher than those primed for 
a managerial-market logic or a professional logic. Similarly, given its association with 
efficiency, competition and market position (Thornton et al., 2005; Saz-Carranza & Longo, 
2012), one would expect study subjects primed for a market-managerial logic to give higher 
ranks to PMS uses for improving productivity and mission effectiveness, for providing a 
rational basis for process improvements, or for enhancing competition, when compared to 
those primed for other logics. And for a logic of the professions that is premised on personal 
reputation, expertise, quality of craft and independence (Thornton et al., 2005; Saz-Carranza 
& Longo, 2012), one would expect greater preferences for PMS use for benchmarking and for 
learning.   
Our results however show a mixed picture. The public-prime study participants showed 
a preference for PMS use in aligning strategic activities to strategic plans, compared market-
managerial-prime participants. This conforms to theoretical prediction that public logics, based 
as they are on a political mandate and on principles of democratic participation (Meyer et al., 
2014), inheres the need for alignment to an agreed-upon or promised plan. We also observe 
that professional-prime participants generally assigned higher ranks to PMS for learning 
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compared to those primed with a public logic. Again, this conforms to theoretical prediction 
that professional logics, whose identity and legitimacy is based on expertise and quality of 
craft (Noordegraaf, 2007; Thornton et al., 2012), would rank PMS use for learning much more 
highly than those primed for either public or market-managerial logic.  
We however observe no significant differences between the market-managerial-prime 
and professional-prime participants in the ranking of the entire list of PMS uses. We also don’t 
observe significant differences between public and market, and public and professional logics 
for many other PMS uses. On the one hand, these are surprising findings given theoretical 
predictions based on differences between the institutional logics. On the other hand, maybe 
not. One explanation for these mixed findings could be that whereas different logics may have 
different emphasis, it may be that for certain uses of PMS, the interests of different logics are 
intertwined (also Rautiainen et al., 2017). This intertwining could arise either through cross-
pollination by ideas from other logics during the evolution of each unique logic; or through 
one logic straddling spheres strongly associated with different, opposing logics, thus 
developing sub-logics that have elements of all. 
To illustrate, across many jurisdictions, market-managerialism has been promoted 
within the public sector under labels such as public management reform and new public 
management (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Given the 
continuing evolution of this struggle, it is conceivable that the current conception of public 
logic may encompass a distortion of the borders between a ‘pure’ form of public logic and the 
market-managerial logic, reflecting ‘a truce following past struggles’ (Meyer & 
Hammerschmid, 2006, p.1002). Thus, individuals primed for a public logic may 
simultaneously draw on this ‘distorted’ frame comprising elements of both public and market-
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managerial logics (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006). Additionally, the health profession 
straddles both the public and the private sectors. Such positioning has been theorized to not 
only expose actors to contradictions inherent in the prevailing institutional logics, but also to 
lower their embeddedness in any specific logic while loosely founding them in all (Thornton 
& Ocasio, 2008). Thus, authors such as Reay and Hinings (2009) posit the health professional 
logic as a superordinate logic comprising the sub-logics of medical professionalism and 
business-like healthcare, co-existing in some form of ‘pragmatic collaboration’. Health 
professionals draw on either of these sub-logics, as appropriate, for their needs (Reay & 
Hinings, 2009).  
In assessing the differences between the treatment and the control groups, we find a 
statistically significant difference between the public-prime group and the control in the rank 
assigned to PMS use for learning. We also find a statistically significant difference between 
the market-prime group and the control, in the rank assigned to PMS use in aligning strategic 
activities to strategic plans. Read together with the between-group comparisons, these findings 
seem to suggest that once primed for a market-managerial logic, preference for PMS use in 
aligning strategic activities to strategic plans was depressed, hence the lower ranks assigned to 
this use by the market-prime condition in comparison to both the public and professional-prime 
conditions. Regarding PMS use for learning, priming public logic suppressed this preference, 
compared to the controls. This corroborates the finding of a statistically significant difference 
in ranking PMS use for learning between the public-prime and professional-prime groups. 
However, there were no statistically significant differences in the rankings for all other 
uses between the public or market prime groups and the control, and neither was there any 
statistically significant difference in the rankings for any of the PMS uses between the 
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professional prime group and the control group. A plausible interpretation of this finding is the 
ubiquity of performance measurement across all three logics, to the degree that preferences 
across many PMS uses have become homogenized.  
In summary, we find evidence suggestive of both logic divergence and consensus as 
far as support for PMS use is concerned. However, the possibility of confounding by sectoral 
experience, and course attended exists. The results revealed that study subjects with public-
sector-only experience ranked PMS use for the enhancement of competition lower than those 
with private-sector-only experience. This makes intuitive sense, given the central role of 
competition in the private sector vis-à-vis the public sector (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012). 
Interestingly though, given the obvious correlation between private sector experience and a 
market-managerial logic on one hand, and a public-sector-only experience with a public logic 
on the other, we do not observe any effect of sectoral experience on PMS use in the alignment 
of activities to strategic plans. This implies that the earlier observed bias of a public logic to 
PMS use for strategic alignment can only be attributable to the priming manipulation.  
Additionally, in assessing whether the course attended had any influence on 
preferences, we observed several statistically significant differences. These included PMS use 
for the alignment of activities to strategic plans, and for learning, thus implying that the course 
attended may be a potential confound for the linkage so far observed between the primed 
institutional logics and PMS use. However, given the observed mixed results, we interpret 
these findings as indicative of the idea that the course attended, rather than propel the study 
subjects toward a specific logic, made the possibilities, strengths and shortcomings of each 
unique logic more manifest to the participants, thus allowing them to draw from all, or to create 
a hybrid understanding of each. In this sense, our study corroborates Meyer and 
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Hammerschmid (2006) finding that educational background (business studies) did not raise the 
probability of a managerial identity being enacted, nor decrease the probability of a public 
logic, but rather increased the probability for hybrid interpretations (p.1009). 
There are however, several limitations to the inferences that we can make from this 
study. In the first instance, this was a laboratory study and as such suffers from threats to 
external validity occasioned by the lack of realism in a laboratory environment (Anderson & 
Stritch, 2016). Additionally, as our sample comprises masters’ level students albeit with a 
professional profile, there are limits to how far we can generalize to the working population 
(Anderson & Stritch, 2016). Replication of this study in the field will therefore likely add 
considerable nuance. 
Moreover, the novelty of our priming tools brings to the fore the possibility of 
inappropriateness or greater-than-intended subtlety in eliciting the desired institutional logics. 
The former is reasonably addressed by adhering to the definitions and keyword lists provided 
by previous authors (e.g. Hyndman et al., 2014), thus enhancing construct validity. Regarding 
the latter, it is possible that the treatments low intensity was not enough to prime institutional 
logics to a degree that could influence preferences. Nonetheless, a counter argument is that 
highly intense treatments would have occasioned a loss of contextual realism by making the 
manipulation obvious, thus triggering effortful correction. Consequently, subsequent use of 
these tools in diverse experiments, will likely lead to their refinement and enhanced utility. 
A final limitation of this study is its small sample size. This was occasioned by the 
design of the study that required both a convenience sample to accommodate resource 
constraints; as well as the need to have practitioner participation, hence the executive master’s 
programs. The implication of such small samples is their reduced statistical power to find small 
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but significant effects (Loken & Gelman, 2017). Additionally, small samples make it difficult 
to ensure randomization across all demographic characteristics or possible control variables, 
and to parse the study population for statistical analysis across multiple variables (Spencer, 
Lay & de Lopez, 2017). Nonetheless, significant effects such as those we have demonstrated 
with a small sample, indicates that the treatment effect is likely larger than the equivalent result 
with a larger sample (Friston, 2012). And although the risk of false positives is high with small 
samples, the use of non-parametric tests to some degree mitigates the possibility of an inflated 
Type I error rate (Zimmerman, 2012; Wiedermann & von Eye, 2013). Moreover, for 
asymmetric distributions, non-parametric procedures are generally more powerful than their 
parametric counterparts (Wiedermann & von Eye, 2013). Still, though we find statistically 
valid results using this sample and with conventional analytic strategies, the obvious 
implication remains a replication study with a larger sample size. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this exploratory study was to provide clues toward a better understanding of the 
relationships between institutional logics and PMS use in public sector organizations. In this 
regard, we find evidence suggestive of both institutional logic divergence and consensus as far 
as support for PMS use is concerned. These findings have been elaborated in the discussion 
above. And so, despite the study’s limitations, we can derive several theoretical and 
methodological contributions, as well as practical implications. 
From a theoretical standpoint, this paper extends and nuances previous work on 
performance measurement in the public sector by examining the influence of institutional 
logics on PMS use, an area that has so far been overlooked (Moynihan & Pandey, 2010). We 
have highlighted differences between institutional logics and their influences on support for 
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PMS use, showing areas of alignment between institutional logics and PMS use as well as 
points of divergence. Our findings thus support the use of institutional logics as appropriate 
analytical tools for examining and explaining contradictory uses of PMS in public sector 
organizations. This perspective will complement the pervasive political, power and 
contingency models, and likely help scholars develop a better understanding of how 
organizational actors interact with performance measurement. 
Second, this study introduces new methodology to the public administration literature 
- priming experiments - that can be appropriated to better examine individual and group level 
perceptions, attitudes, judgments, decision-making and behavior (Bargh, 2006). Moreover, as 
the reported study was a true experiment in the fashion described by Shadish, Cook and 
Campbell (2002), the observed differences being partially attributable to the priming 
manipulation, suggest the capability of text in activating commensurate institutional logics. 
This finding, supports those of researchers in the social and cognitive psychology fields (e.g. 
Vohs et al., 2006), as well as assertions by management scholars that words can be used to 
‘convert ongoing cues into meaning’ (e.g., Colyvas & Powell, 2006). And, whereas 
practitioners and scholars may feel that public sector workers’ judgments and motives 
regarding performance measurement are freely chosen, and reflective of due consideration of 
organizational intent, the findings of this experiment suggest that this impression is only 
partially true. Judgments and motive are seemingly nonconsciously influenced by the actor’s 
most accessible frames of reference, among them, institutional logics. Consequently, 
difficulties and conflicts in PMS implementation and use, may arise from differences in 
organizational actor identification with, and referencing from, the different logics.    
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Thus, for managers developing a common goal or attempting to harness support for 
PMS, they can choose to leverage inherent affinities between specific logics and PMS uses, to 
mobilize support for the PMS in its entirety; or they can choose to appeal to a specific use 
depending on the target audience. Moreover, given the suggested importance of text in priming 
commensurate institutional logics, managers can choose to either differentiate text to appeal to 
different identities; or they can utilize text in manner that legitimizes across different 
institutional logics i.e., deploy multivalent key words or combine key words to activate 
favorable logics (Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008). 
However, as a single study, this paper’s findings are in no way conclusive. Much more 
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Appendix 4.1. A synopsis of institutional logics and identification of key words 




Neutral and objective 
public administrative 
activity, objectives 
selected in accordance 
with political rationality 
Investor and managerial 
capitalism, objectives selected 
in accordance with economic 
and organizational rationality 
Personal capitalism, 







Competitive, led by 
management teams, 
decentralized control 







Formal procedure Processes and results Professional ideals, 




Based on regulation, 
compliance 
Efficiency and effectiveness 
evaluation 
Internal and external peer 
review 









































- Expertiseʸ/reputation  
- professional autonomy, 
professional independenceʸ 
- Standards, peer review  
- Nobleʸ  
- Doctors/Physicians*ʸ  
- Medical, Health, 
Hospital*ʸ  
- Patient, Clinical*ʸ 
ª´ˣ´ʸ Specific words included in scrambled sentence test and intended to prime commensurate logic. 
* Specific to the health professional logic. 






Appendix 4.2. Sample Scrambled Sentence Test intended to prime a public logic 
ENGLISH PROFICIENCY TEST (SCRAMBLED SENTENCE CODE: 1A) 
INSTRUCTIONS: Create a sensible phrase using only 4 words (or word pair combinations), as separated by 
commas, in each of the following 5-word (or word pair combination) sets. 
For example: “cold, so, it, outside, was,” may be rewritten as “it was so cold” or “it was cold outside” 
Take as much time as you need but please try not to exceed 10 minutes 
bureaucratic, is, government, good, then  
compliance, very, important, is, not  
hierarchy, management, orderly, scrambled, ensures  
ensures, fair, is, government, distribution  
rules, followed, must, the, be  
We, public interest, work, must, for  
procedure, must, public-servants, follow, light  
Objectivity, is, work, very, important  
legal statutes, public, servants, guide, others  
public opinion, government, to, matters, us  
public good, governments, valued, provide, always  
public administration, delivery, public goods, 
supports, the 
 
neutral, he, be, must, public servants  
bureaucracy, orderly, communication, work, ensures  
regulations, help, always, order, create  
was, not, there, he, in  
hot, it, outside, was, so  
never, the, she, cooking, does  
weekly, tennis, play, you, do  
going, to, I´m, him, see  
calls, she, ever, remembers, hardly  
you, see, me, can, now  
never, I, breakfast, eat, daily  
go, now, home, will, I  
speaks, she, learn, English, does  
you, don’t, coffee, do, like  
the, up, I, balloon, blew  
raining, is, outside, hard, it  
heavy, this, table, too, is  








CHAPTER 5  
REVIEWING THE COHESIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE ESSAYS 
 
This chapter presents a brief integrated discussion of the theoretical contributions; the 
managerial, practical and policy implications; and future research opportunities deriving from 








The first essay (Chapter 2) presented an aggregative conceptual model that demonstrated the 
pervasive influence of institutional logics on performance measurement implementation in the 
public sector. In this sense, the essay synthesized and organized what is known in the literature, 
connecting extant dots, and presenting new propositions to guide future research. At its core, 
the essay presents institutional logics, in their application as cognitive frames of reference, as 
contributors to the variation seen in PMS implementation in the public sector. 
The second and third studies (Chapters 3 and 4) present the possibility of priming 
institutional logics through text or visual cues, and demonstrate the differential relationships 
between institutional logics and judgment in ambiguous scenarios (Study 2/Chapter 3), and 
between institutional logics and PMS use (Study 3/Chapter 4). Thus, beyond providing 
empirical evidence for the nonconscious influence of institutional logics on organizational 
actor perception, judgment and action regarding public sector performance measurement, these 
latter two essays/studies open possibilities for ex ante public management research using 
priming as a technique.  
A summary of the cohesive theoretical and practical contributions of the three essays 
is presented below. 
5.2 Theoretical contributions 
The first essay (Chapter 2) conceptualizes performance measurement as decision-making and 
presents an apt framework for depicting how variations in implementation can arise from the 
implicit and explicit influence of institutional logics on the agency (and institutional work) of 
organizational actors within broader contextual constraints. In this sense, the essay re-orients 
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research toward a view of PMS implementation that underscores performance measurement as 
social construction, and that stresses the relational and interpretive nature of human activity 
within specific contextual constraints and enablements. This is important as though exceptions 
exist (e.g., Yang & Modell, 2012), much of the performance literature applying an institutional 
lens has been preoccupied with the macro and meso-levels of analysis, and has ignored the role 
and experiences of the organizational actor in relation to the institutions within which they are 
embedded. Moreover, the synthesis of relevant literature and the proposed model that draws 
on prior others in decision-making (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 1976; Mazzolini, 1981) and in the 
field of performance measurement and management (e.g., De Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001), 
connects extant research dots and sets the stage for subsequent empirical testing that can only 
advance the field of public sector performance measurement and management. 
The second study (Chapter 3) made use of text as a ubiquitous cue in work 
environments, to prime institutional logics, and obtained significant measurable impacts on 
organizational actor perception and judgment. Thus, the outcomes of this study not only 
suggest that environmental stimuli can prompt changes in cognitive models, but also that the 
initial stance taken by individuals on issues that confront them, is an indirect result of subtle, 
and possibly not so subtle, cues from the environment. Moreover, by demonstrating 
nonconscious influence, the study presents empirical evidence on how actors’ perceptions and 
judgment are conditioned by the very institutions that they at times consciously engage with 
and/or seek to change. The study thus advances the growing body of micro-level research on 
institutional logics that examine the lived experiences of actors in the world of work as they 
navigate, interpret and translate institutional complexity (see also Goodrick & Reay, 2011; 
Waldorff et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2017). It also builds on the work of earlier authors (e.g., 
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Ganegoda & Folger, 2015; Swan & Clark, 2008) in developing the concept of institutional 
logics as frames of reference for the individual organizational actor, an aspect has not been 
adequately considered in the organizational behavior or public management literature 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). 
The third study (Chapter 4) examines the influence of institutional logics on the 
deployment and use of performance measurement systems in the public sector. The paper thus 
extends and nuances previous work on performance measurement systems use in the public 
sector (e.g., Franco-Santos et al., 2007; Fryer, Antony & Ogden, 2009; Moynihan & Pandey, 
2010; Hammerschmid, van de Walle & Stimac, 2013; Kroll, 2015) by examining an area that 
has so far been overlooked. In this regard, the paper reveals that contrary to theoretical 
predictions, there is logic congruence regarding some uses of performance measurement 
systems in the public sector, and divergence regarding others.  
5.3 Practical, managerial and policy implications 
Put together, the findings of the latter two studies show that institutional logics do have an 
influence on organizational actor perception and judgment. Thus, the greater the diversity of 
logics they draw from, the greater the diversity of possible responses to any PMS 
issue/situation that confronts them in the organization. Moreover, both studies do demonstrate 
that the environment – in this case, text – has the potential of nonconsciously surfacing unique 
logics through priming effects (see also Bargh, 2006; Vohs et al., 2006). Public sector 
managers may therefore want to consider how they frame and communicate performance 
measurement issues of strategic import, if the organization is to secure broad-based support 
towards their implementation. And so, for managers intent on developing a common 
performance measurement goal or attempting to harness broad-based support for PMS, they 
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can choose to leverage inherent affinities between specific logics and PMS uses; or they can 
choose to make targeted appeals drawing on the hypothesized relationships between specific 
logics and particular PMS uses. 
For the public administration academic practitioner, the latter two studies introduce 
novel experimental methodology that can be exploited to better understand cognitive 
influences and inter-personal interactions at the micro-level. 
5.4 Limitations and future research 
The ambition of the thesis was very broad, and despite our best intentions there were a number 
of limitations. These are provided in great detail with each essay/study as they are study-
specific, and will not be repeated here for the sake of parsimony. Similarly, elements relating 
to future research have been discussed in the relevant subsections of each essay. We 
nonetheless, highlight some of the broad opportunities for future research.  
The first study presents several propositions that need to be further investigated. Indeed 
studies 2 and 3 are a first step toward addressing proposition 1. Studies 2 and 3 open the space 
for assessing cognitive biases in performance-measurement-related decision-making as 
opposed to performance-measurement decision-making based on fixed criteria. The two 
studies press for research that assesses the influence of these cognitive frames under conditions 
allowing for possible counterfactual thinking; as well as examination of the role of text in 
priming institutional logics or other cognitive frames, that are then used as perceptual lenses 
by decision makers at all levels in the performance measurement and management process. 
Thus beyond looking at the replicability (or otherwise) of the latter two experimental studies, 
future research could, for example, (1) test the tenacity of the hold that these institutional logics 
have on organizational actor perception given the possibility of conflict between the diverse 
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logics, regarding how any organizational situation is perceived, (2) explore the possibility of 
moderators or mediators of the nonconscious activation of institutional logics, including the 
role of context; and (3) examine the nature of interaction between the nonconscious influence 
of institutional logics and conscious cognitive processes, motives and goals. 
Studies 2 and 3 were however exploratory studies that were based on small samples. 
They were also designed as laboratory experiments may thus be criticized for lacking some 
degree of realism. Replication of these studies with larger samples and at best in the field will 
therefore likely add considerable nuance. Nonetheless, the significant results obtained open the 
door for further and more rigorous testing, as well as extension and probing of the emergent 
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